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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will examine the merits of two major recurrent proposals to reform the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB or
Board's) administration of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA
or Act).' Despite the persuasive call by Judge Posner 2 and Board
Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., Catholic University; M.B.A., Wayne State University, J.D., University of Detroit School of Law;,
L.L.M., Yale University.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§151-169 (1982).
2. See, e.g., NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[W]hile the
Board is entitled to some judicial deference in interpreting its organic statute as
*
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member Dennis 3 for Board utilization of rulemaking, this Article concludes that the stabilization achieved by rulemaking could dangerously freeze labor policy. The Board's political viability would be
sapped without offsetting advantages. The Board should continue to
adjudicate, rather than resort to rulemaking. A federal labor court of
appeals is a better alternative to stabilize labor law policy and administration while preserving the Board's necessary political flexibility.
These proposed administrative reforms occur within the larger
political context of a beseiged Reagan Board that is roundly criticized
from many quarters. Several controversial Board decisions within the
past two years, reversing many Carter Board precedents, have understandably engendered criticism. 4 For the past quarter century, the
Board has had the unenviable task of effecting coordinated administration of national labor policy in the face of steady judicial erosion of
the labor preemption doctrine.5 This judicial deterioration of the
well as in finding facts, it would be entitled to even more if it. . .awakened its
dormant rulemaking powers .... ).
3. See, e.g., St. Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 160, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1465, 1472
(1984), where in a concurring opinion Board Member Dennis stated:
I would have preferred ... that the Board clearly define a limited
number of appropriate health care units, after full consideration of the
positions and interests of all elements of the industry, through its
rulemaking authority. Such an approach, in my view, would have provided health care labor relations with immediate stability and certainty,
and obviated continued litigation before the Board and courts.
See also NLRB Rulemaking ForHealth-Care Units, 119 LAB. REL. REP. 9 (BNA)
(May 6, 1985) (Board Member Dennis reiterating her call for NLRB rulemaking
in the health care industry).
4. For a compendium of the most controversial Reagan Board decisions in 1982-84,
see Raugh, Reversals By The NLRB: A Union View - BoardReversals Retroactivity and Fairness,37 N.Y.U. CoNF.ON LABOR §9.01, §9.05, at 9-22 to 24 (1984). See
also Estreicher, Policy OscillationAt The Labor Board. A PleaFor Rulemaking,
37 N.Y.U. CoNF.ON LABOR §10.1, at 10-1 n.1 (1984). For a comprehensive analysis
of the most important decisions of the Reagan Board in 1984, see Gregory & Mak,
SignificantDecisions Of The NLRB, 1984: The Reagan Board's Celebrationof the
FiftiethAnniversary of the NLRA, 18 CONN. L. REV. - (1985).
5. With only a few exceptions since the landmark labor preemption decision of San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding the NLRB
had primary jurisdiction over activity arguably protected or prohibited by sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA), the Supreme Court has held state causes of action not
preempted by federal labor law in a wide variety of cases. See Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985) (state minimum health benefit
insurance law not preempted by ERISA); Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Int'l Union, Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984) (state law
against labor union corruption not preempted by LMRDA); Bellknap v. Hale, 103
S. Ct. 3172 (1983) (strike replacements' state law actions for misrepresentation
and breach of contract not preempted). Cf. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct.
1904 (1985) (state tort and contract law action by individual against employer preempted by § 301 of LMRA); Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones,
103 S. Ct. 1453 (1983) (state tort law action by individual against union preempted). For comprehensive analysis of the labor preemption doctrine and the
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Board's primary jurisdiction over conduct within the umbrella of the
Act, by the ominous trend toward decentralized state court determinations of important labor law issues, has been further exacerbated by
the states' rights philosophy of the Reagan administration.6 This longterm, broad philosophical assault on the Board is administratively
manifested in the chronic understaffing of the Board during the past
two years, 7 and the consequent case backlog,8 provoking yet further
pertinent Burger Court decisions, see Gregory, Toward Remedying The Concomitant Erosion Of The Labor PreemptionDoctrine and National Labor Policy, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. - (1986). For the representative general position that the
Garmon labor preemption rule has been overwhelmed by its many exceptions,
see Note, Preemption in Labor Law Adjudications" A Case Where The Exceptions are Swallowing The Rule, 24 S.D.L. REv. 466 (1979).
6. For an excellent assessment of the "new" federalism of the Reagan administration, see Note, JudicialExamination of Deregulation:Exploring The Boundaries
Of Executive Discretion,59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 86 (1984). See also infra note 161.
7. Since President Reagan took office in 1981, six members have left the Board
(Chair Fanning, and Members Jenkins, Miller, Truesdale, Zimmerman, and
Hunter). Reagan-nominated Chair Van de Water could not obtain Senate approval. Only two members successfully appointed by President Reagan since
1981 remain on the Board (Chair Dotson since Mar., 1983, and Member Dennis
since May, 1983). The Board had operated with four members since the vacancy
caused by the expiration of Howard Jenkins' term had been unfilled since Aug.,
1983. The Board was further reduced to only three persons with the expiration of
Donald Zimmerman's term in Dec., 1984. With President Reagan's Mar., 1985
nominees, Wilford Johansen and Marshall Babson confirmed by the Senate in
May, 1985, the Board was briefly restored to its full five person complement for
the first time in two years. Nomination For Two NLRB Vacancies, 118 LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 201 (Mar. 18, 1985). Unfortunatly, Member Hunter left the Board
with the expiration of his term in Aug., 1985, and did not seek reappointment.
Hunter Departs,119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 270 (July 29, 1985). The turnover in
Board members and the pronounced gaps in nominating successors have been
widely criticized, ranging from Democratic congressional committees to conservative foundations to NLRB Chair Dotson. See HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T. OPERATIONS, DELAY, SLowNFss AND DECISIONMAKING AND THE CASE BACKLOG AT THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, H.R. REP. No. 1141, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) [hereinafter cited as BACKLOG]; STAFF OF HOUSE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS SUBCOMM., 98TH CONG., 2D SEss. FAILURE OF THE LABOR LAw - A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS (Comm. Print 1984); Dotson, ProcessingCasesAt
the NLRB, 35 LAB. L.J. 3, 5 (1984) ('"The first and foremost problem has been the
turnover of Board Members.... Since December 1979, eleven [now thirteen]
individuals have served as Board Members."); Heritage Foundation Report On
Labor Policy, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 285, 286 (Dec. 10, 1984) (The conservative Heritage Foundation's 600 page report to the Reagan administration, MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP II, recommended that the President keep the five person
Board at full strength.).
8. In Feb., 1984, a record backlog of 1,647 cases awaited decision by the Board. Criticism ofNLRB Politicization,Backlog, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 121,123-24 (Oct.
15, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Criticism]. See also BACKLOG, supra note 7, at 4
('"The National Labor Relations Board is in a crisis. Delays in decisionmaking at
the Board level and a staggering and debilitating case backlog have resulted in
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criticism.9

Understood in this broader political context, the Board may be the
victim rather than the cause of badly fragmented labor law theory and
administration. This Article's renewed proposal for the federal labor
court of appeals is certainly not a panecea for this panoply of
problems. However, the many advantages of the proposed labor court,
and the continued use of Board adjudication, will be steps toward labor policy stabilization and defusion of the political tensions currently
afflicting labor law administration.
The NLRB has always been highly politicized. NLRB members
are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, for staggered terms. Presidential appointment virtually guarantees that the NLRB will reflect majoritarian politics. NLRB appointees usually implement labor policy consonant with that of the
appointing President. Political choices through NLRB decisions have
always provoked heated criticism. Throughout the Board's first seventeen years, NLRB members were appointed exclusively by Democrats Roosevelt and Truman. Employers routinely castigated the
NLRB from the outset as exclusively pro-labor.10 Union unfair labor
workers being forced to wait years before cases. . . are decided.. . . The case
backlog at the Board has risen to a record level.
...
).
The congressional criticism prompted some Board action. In fiscal 1984, the
Board issued 1,346 decision, a 53 percent increase over the 880 decisions issued in
fiscal 1983. As of October 1, 1984, there were 1,313 pending cases, a decrease of
334 cases since February 1, 1984, when there was a record backlog of 1,647 cases.
Criticism,supra,at 123-24. NLRB Chair Dotson said that the Board was making
a "concerted effort" to reduce the number of pending cases. 116 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 41 (May 21, 1984). From deciding a record 1,185 decision in 1979, the 602
unfair labor practice (ULP) decisions by the NLRB in 1983 marked a three-year
low. In late May, 1984, the Board faced a backlog of 1,459 ULP cases; the normal
backlog is 400-500 ULP cases. Id. at 41-42. As of July, 1985, there were 1,200
pending cases. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1985, at A14, cols. 2 & 4. See also the related
recent statements by Board Chair Dotson on his plans to deal with the NLRB's
case backlog. Case Backlog at Labor Board, 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 186 (Mar.
5, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Case Backlog]; 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 163 (Feb.
27, 1984); Irving, The Crises At The NLRB: A Call For Reordering Priorities,7
Emp. REL. L.J. 47 (1981).
9. In addition to the congressional criticism of the NLRB case backlog, see supra
notes 7 & 8, there has been notorious, highly publicized internal criticism among
the Board members. Member Zimmerman was highly criticial of the Board's
lack of the collegiality throughout 1984, the final year of his term. Interview
With Retiring NLRB Member, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 326 (Dec. 24,1984). For
an overview of the internal controversay at the Board, see Middleton, NLRB: An
Agency In Turmoil, Nat'l L.J. 1 (July 2,1984); Wall St. J., June 28,1984, at 29, col.
3. See also Walther, Suggestions and Comments on the Future Directionof the
NRLB, 34 LAB. L.J. 215, 228 (1983); Letter-WritingContest Over NRLB Case Backlog, 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 289 (Dec. 10, 1984); Keller, Infighting at Labor
Board is Reported, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1984, at A21, col. 4.
10. For a compendium of early references to employer opposition to the Board and to
the NLRA at the outset, see Gellhorn & Linfield, Politicsand Labor Relations: A
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practices were not made part of the Act until the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments, in partial response to incessant employer criticims. Eisenhower was the first Republican president to appoint NLRB members, and labor was quickly outraged with Eisenhower Board reversals
of precedent set by prior Democratic Boards."1 Criticism of the Board
has been most pronounced by the party outside the White House. Predictably, employer advocates railed against the Democratic Boards of
Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter.' 2 In turn, labor criticized the RepubliAppraisal of Criticisms of NLRB Procedure,39 CoLuM. L. REv. 339 (1939). See
also H. Mius

& E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT HARTLEY (1950);

Booker & Coe, An Analysis of the Objectivity of the Criticisms of the National
LaborRelations Board, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 535 (1968); Booker & Coe, The NLRB and
its Critics,17 LAB. L.J. 522 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Booker & Coe, Critics];A
STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 281-85 (1950).

Perhaps the classic popular article criticising the NLRB as the tool of labor
was, and remains, The G - D - LaborBoard, 18 FORTUNE 52 (Oct. 1938). See also
Green, LaborBoard vs. LaborAct, 19 FORTUNE 97 (Feb. 1939). Significantly, William Green was president of the AFL when he repeatedly castigated the "radical
minded if not communistic" Board as favoring industrial unions (CIO) and destroying the AFL craft unions. The AFL and CIO were then openly antagonistic,
and were diametrically opposed to their ultimately successful merger.
In 1940, a special committee of the House concluded that some Board members had "radical tendencies" and "pronounced pro-C.I.O. sympathies." HOUSE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE NAT.'L LAB. REL. BD., FINAL REPORT,
No. 3109, PART I, 76th Cong.,3d Sess. 149 (1940).
For a balanced response to the critics of the NLRB, regardless of political
stripe, see Dunau, The Role of Criticism In The Work of The National Labor
Relations Board, 16 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 205 (1963). Some studies indicate
that general economic conditions, rather than the political philosophy of the
Board members, are more determinative of Board decisions. See, e.g., Booker &
Trafford, Environmentand NLRB Bias, 17 LAB. L.J. 202 (1966); Booker & Trafford, The Predictabilityof NLRB Decisions, 16 LAB. L.J. 423 (1965).
n. Briner, Member Murdock Dissenting, 7 LAB. L.J. 83 (1956); Cohen, The NLRB
and Its Customers, 6 LAB. L.J. 109 (1955); Rather, The Quasi-JudicialNLRB Revisited, 12 LAB. L.J. 685 (1961); Rather, Policy-Making by the New "Quasi-Judicial" NLRB, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 12 (1955); Rather, Recent Changes In National
Labor Relations Board Policies, 8 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 143 (1955); Seligson,
The NationalLabor Relations Board- A Proposal,6 LAB. L. J. 105 (1955). For a
more balanced view of the Eisenhower Board, see Note, The NLRB Under Republican Administration: Recent Trends and Their Political Implications, 55
COLUM. L. REv. 852 (1955).
12. Browne, The NationalLaborRelationsBoard. LaborLaw Rewritten, 49 A.B.A. J.
64 (1963); Christensen, The "New" NLRB: An Analysis of Current Policy, 15
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 213 (1962); Petro, Expertise, The NLRB, and The Constitution: Things Abused and Things Forgotten,14 WAYNE L. REv. 1126, 1146, 1151
(1968) ('"The Board seems to want every employee in the nation to wear a union
label ....
President Kennedy had a blatantly pro-union majority within a year
or so of his accession."); Phillips, Resolved-- That the NLRB Be Replaced, 20 LAB.
L.J. 631 (1969); Van de Water, TheNLRB... New Directions,12 STETSON L. REv.
297 (1983); Walther, supra note 9, at 215. Cf Murphy, The NationalLabor Relations Board - An Appraisal, 52 MINN. L. REv. 819, 944 (1968) ("Certainly the
Board is not pro-union in any invidious or opprobrious sense ....
[Tihe Board
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can Boards of Nixon and Ford.13 Perhaps never before has organized
labor's criticism of the NLRB been so pronounced as it is of the Reagan Board.14 Past periodic cries for structural, institutional reform of
may fairly be said to be pro-union."). See also the summary of criticisms in
Booker & Coe, Critics, supra note 10.
13. The Nixon-Ford Board did not significantly raise the ire of labor commentators,
especially relative to the controversies that routinely followed changes in Board
personnel and policy from other presidential administrations. The Board took a
relatively restrained, cautious stance during this period. Miller, Administrative
Decision-Making- Mortal or Immortal?, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 1131 (1974). See also
Beard & Player, Whither The Nixon Board?, 7 GA.L. REV.607 (1973); Isaacson,
The Discernible Trends in the "Miller"Board - PracticalConsiderationsfor the
Labor Counsel, 23 LAB. L.J. 531 (1972).
14. AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland castigated the Reagan Board as "anti-labor
ideologues," and as advocates of "the most narrow, retrograde employer interests .. " Criticismof Labor Department,115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 195 (Mar.
5, 1984). In addition, the AFL-CIO Executive Council categorized the Reagan
Board's policy as one of "malevolence" toward labor. AFL-CIO Views on NLRB
Actions, 116 LAB.REL.REP.(BNA) 46 (May 21, 1984).
In three days of hearings before the Labor Advisory Commitee of the Repblican National Committee, several union advocates sharply criticized NLRB decisions and the labor policies of the Reagan administration. Thomas Gleason,
president of the Longshoremen's Union, said "the pendulum in Labor Board decisions has swung so rapidly and erratically over the recent past that volumes of
Board precedents no longer can be relied upon by unions or employers and their
legal counsel." CriticizingNLRB at Republican Hearings,116 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 189, 190 (July 9, 1984). See also DebatingMerits of CurrentNLRB Decisions, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (Apr. 15, 1985) (SMU law professor Charles
Morris charged the NLRB with reinterpreting the Act to infringe on specific congressional objectives); Impact On NLRB of ChairmanDotson, 117 LAB. REL REP.
(BNA) 164 (Oct. 29, 1984); Unions' Opposition to St FrancisDecision, 117 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 131 (Oct. 15,1984); ChallengingImpartialityof NLRB, 115 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 179 (July 2,1984). See generally Vehar, Labor Law Reform: Do
Labor OrganizationsHave Equal Access to the Sytem?, 62 DENVER U. L. REV.572
(1985).
On related fronts, organized labor has opposed most of the Reagan adminsitration's nominees to the Board. For example, the Teamsters Union led demands on
the White House to fire Donald Dotson as Chair of the NLRB. Wall St. J., May
22, 1984, at 1, col. 5. Labor had initially opposed the appointment of Dotson to the
Board. Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1983, at 3, col. 4. Before the Senate's surprising confirmation of Rosemary Collyer as the NLRB General Counsel by voice vote on April
4, 1985, her nomination had been bitterly opposed by organized labor. See Approval of Collyer as NLRB GeneralCounsel, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 287 (Apr.
15, 1985). See also ALF-CIO Opposition to Collyer Nomination, 116 LAB. RE.
REP. (BNA) 30 (May 14, 1984) (AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland said that Collyer had "no visible qualifications in the field of labor law" and that her appointment is another example of the Reagan adminsitration's "contempt for the rights
and concerns of working people." Organized labor also took a skeptical preliminary view regarding the Reagan nomination of management attorney Marshall
Babson to the NLRB. See Nominationsfor Two NLRB Vacancies, 118 LAB. RE.
REP. (BNA) 201 (Mar. 18, 1985).
But the Reagan Board has also been strongly defended. Former NLRB General Counsel William Lubbers, a Democrat appointed by President Carter, cautioned restraint in the vitriolic, partisan criticism of the Reagan Board. While
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the Board are resurfacing. Advocacy of rulemaking rather than the
Board's historic use of adjudiction to formulate or to change policy is
particularly resurgent.1 5 Radical cries have even been issued for the
abolition of the NLRA.16
labor law reform legislation seems inevitable, mitigating the "flamboyant and extreme" "vehemence, emotion, and rhetoric" of the criticisms would enable a more
well-reasoned, constructive evaluation. Cool Rhetoric; Bitter NLRB Debate, 115
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (Mar. 12, 1984). See also DebatingMerits of CurrentNLRB
Decisions,118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 281 (Apr. 15, 1985) (Management A. John
Harper, II maintains that the Reagan Board decisions have restored Board credibility in the courts of appeals); Defense of Board by ChairmanDotson, 119 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 69 (May 27, 1985) (Dotson "laments that some of his critics
belong to the 'chicken little school of social analysis' - those who foresee the
death of collective bargaining, the collapse of the National Labor Relations Act,
and the return 'to the law of the jungle.' "); Defense of Board Decisionsand Nominees, 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 266 (Apr. 8,1985); Defense of NLRB's Performance, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 103 (June 11, 1984); Defense of NRLB Rulings,
116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 3 (May 7,1984); (NRLB member Dennis, appointed by
President Reagan in 1983, characterized significant Reagan Board decisions as a
"return to 'normalcy' rather than a curtailment of the rights of unions and individual emloyees."); NLRB' Dotson on FirstYear, 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 163
(Feb. 27, 1984) (NLRB Chair Dotson responded to labor criticisms of Reagan
Board decisions by asserting that the 1984 case backlog will dissipate with the
issuance of several long-awaited, and highly controversial, lead cases by the
Board).
See also Rulemaking as Aid in NLRB Policy Reversals, 116 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 142, 144 (June 25, 1984). Former NLRB General Counsel Peter Nash defended recent controversial decisions of the Reagan Board as self-correcting the
badly pro-labor excesses of the Carter Board. Nash stated that "the 'fervor' over
the Board's recent policy reversals is the 'result of a larger political agenda' on
the part of labor advocates. There has not been a substantial reversal of Board
doctrine if you read and analyze the decisions."'
15. See supra notes 2 & 3.
16. See REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE (1984); Epstein, Abolish the Board,Deregulate Unions, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1985, at F2, col. 3; Epstein, A Common Law for
Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L. J.
1257 (1983) (The NLRA "is in large measure a mistake that, if possible, should be
scrapped in favor of the adoption of a sensible common law regime relying heavily upon tort and contract law."); Mikva, Hard Times for Labor, 7 INDus. REL.
L.J. 345 (1985); Petro, On Amending The Taft-Hartley Act, 4 LAB. L.J. 67, 156
(1953); Petro, Expertise, The NLRB and The Constitution:-Things Abused and
Things Forgotten, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1126, (1968); Seligson, The NLRB: A Proposal, 6 LAB. L.J. 103 (1955) ("[IThe flow of events in the past 20 years has minimized the importance of the Board to the extent that serious consideration
should be given to its abolition."); Tost & Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief CallsLabor Laws
a "DeadLetter" Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8, col. 4 (Lane Kirkland stated labor
may be better off if the NLRA were repealed); Pacfic Coast Labor Law Conference, 119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 47, 48 (May 20, 1985) (James Herman, president
of the International Longshoremen's Union, urged unions to avoid resort to the
NLRB). See also Vehar, supra note 14:
[When asked whether] we ought to return to the law of the jungle,
through a repeal of the Act... our answer is that we are living under
the law of the jungle right now, except that unions are living in a cage
and the employers are well armed ....
The time has come for us to
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The better course is to stabilize labor law without entirely depoliticizing the positive political responsiveness of the Board. This can
be accomplished by refining and implementing several decade-old proposals for the creation of a federal labor court of appeals.
This Article will analyze the most significant proposals for internal
and external reforms of the NLRB and of NLRA administration. Initially, it will review current reform proposals for NLRB rulemaking
rather than adjudication. Despite its facial appeal, NLRB rulemaking
is not generally feasible. Adjudication should continue to be the
Board instrument for effecting policy determinations and changes.
After reviewing earlier proposals calling for the creation of a labor
court, a refined proposal regarding a federal labor court of appeals will
be profferred. It is politically capable of implementation and it is
more modest in scope than prior reforms.
question whether the National Labor Relations Act... has become an
albatross on the labor movement.
Id. at 571 n.3 (statements of Robert Pleasure, Associate General Counsel for the
Carpenters Union and of Richard Trumka, President of the United Mine Workers, June, 1984, to the House Labor-Management Rel. Subcomm.).
However, there have been forceful responses. See, e.g., Apear, Kirkland'sCall
to Void Labor Law Ignites a GrowingNationalDebate, Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1984,
at 33, col. 3; Discussion of NLRB Policies at New York Bar Association, 119 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 71 (May 27, 1985) (Samuel Kaynard, regional director of the
NLRB in Brooklyn, New York, said the NLRA has worked well for 50 years and
"the absence of either the Act or the Board would serve no purpose."); Pacific
Coast Labor Law Conference, 119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 47 (May 20, 1985) (Arthur Goldberg, general counsel of the Textile Workers Union, said deregulating
labor law and repealing the Act is unwarranted, would leave employees and unions unprotected and operating under a regime of remployer-imposed rules).
See also Bartosic, Labor Law Reform - The NLRB and A Labor Court,4 GA. L.
REv. 647 (1970) (Dean Bartosic called these radical abolitionists "Bourbons...
who use the Board as a whipping boy when their actual purpose is to attack ruthlessly the institution of collective bargaining."); Getman & Kohler, The Common
Law, LaborLaw, and Reality: A Response to ProfessorEpstein,92 YALE L.J. 1415,
1416 (1983) ("Professor Epstein reiterates many of the same propositions, syllogisms, and rationalizations of those who opposed the enactment of the NLRA and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the first place."); Estreicher, Workers Still Need Labor Law's Shield, N.Y. Times, July 21,1985, at F2, col. 3; Gould, Mistaken Opposition to the NLRB, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985 at A27, col. 2, ("Lane Kirkland,
President of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., is toying with a misguided proposal by advocating
the repeal of the National Labor Relations Act....
Labor is in no position to
discard the protections under the Act and to return to bare-fisted scuffles with
management. The law, for the most part, has served labor well, and union leadership should work to strengthen it, not abolish it ....
Repeal of the act on its 50th
anniversary would sacrifice the benefits of law without eliminating its burdens.");
Irving, Do We Need A LaborBoard?, 30 LAB. L.J. 387 (1979); Jenkins, What is the
National Labor Relations Board?, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 354, 355 (1959) (the NLRB
"or a similar institution is absolutely essential to the proper functioning of an
industrial democracy."); Rather, The Quasi-JudicialNLRB Revisited, supra note
11, at 686 ("Under the guise of attacking the Board as one-sided and biased, what
they were really attacking was the statutory scheme itself.").
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Under this proposal, the NLRB will not be substantively or administratively altered in any significant way. The Board would be stabilized but would not be completely depoliticized. The single federal
labor court of appeals, rather than the present twelve circuits, would
hear all appeals from NLRB decisions. This will coordinate and centralize NLRA jurisprudence, and end balkanization among the circuits. The federal labor court of appeals would also coordinate NLRA
jurisprudence, and would provide the NLRB, labor, and employers
with a reasonable and predictable barometer of federal judicial attitudes and prospects of enforcement for NLRB orders. The single labor appellate court would concentrate judicial expertise.
At least initially, the court would focus exclusively on appeals from
NLRB decisions. The court's labor expertise would not be diluted by a
panoply of other substantive legal subjects on crowded dockets. The
case loads of the other circuit courts would be at least marginally reduced. These would be ancillary, but significant, advantages of a single federal labor appellate court. With one federal appellate court
hearing all appeals taken from NLRB decisions, the number of labor
cases proceeding to the Supreme Court would also be reduced. Conflict among the various circuits regarding NLRB decisions and NLRA
law would be eliminated, and with it one of the causes for the granting
of certiorari by the Supreme Court. The federal labor court of appeals
would effectively become the final court for most significant NLRB
labor decisions. Over time, conflicts among different panels of the labor court could be internally resolved.
The first judicial appointments to the new labor court would have
to be engineered politically between the opposition party Senate leadership and the appointing President prior to the actual appointments
and as the necessary implicit condition to passage of the enabling legislation. The Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 offers a recent schematic for a realistic political compromise for
judicial appointments. A delicate political deal must first be arranged
to insure appointments of primarily centrist compromise candidates to
the labor court. Given the rigid ideological tests applied to judicial
candidates by the Reagan Administration, this would be difficult, but
not impossible to arrange. The NLRB and evolution of NLRA law
could eventually achieve a moderate balance. Board politics would be
tempered by the labor court's appellate jurisprudence but, prudently,
not eliminated.
While still remaining politically responsive, the NLRB would avoid
radical and contradictory fluctuations in its decisions. The coordination and integration effected by a centrist, moderate federal labor
court of appeals and a still politically responsive but jurisprudentially
stabilized NLRB will significantly strenghthen prospects for achieving
coherent labor law jurisprudence. The unpalatable alternative is in-
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creasing cynicism and disregard for the NLRB and the Act and for
meaningful labor law administration, practice, and theory.
II. THE RULEMAKING VS. ADJUDICATION DEBATE: THE
MERITS OF CONTINUED NLRB ADJUDICATION AS
THE PREFERRED LABOR POLICY
INSTRUMENT
Adjudication, 17 rather than rulemaking,18 has been the Board's
most important and virtually exclusive policy and law making instrument.' 9 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)20 provides that an
17. "Adjudication" is defined in the APA as an "agency process for the formulation
of an order." 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1982). In turn, an "order" is "the whole or part of
a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in
form, of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking but including licensing."
Id. at § 551(6). Adjudication by the NLRB takes place in the context of an adversary hearing between immediate parties to an actual case or controversy. There
is the standard notice, pleadings and answers to the charges, hearing, briefing,
and decision. When Board determines or changes broad policy through adjudication, it transforms the former process, in a convoluted way, into the ultimate
functional equivalent of rulemaking. Adjudication can sweep as broadly as
rulemaking. Estreicher, Rulemaking as Aid in NLRB PolicyReversals, 116 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 142, 144 (June 25, 1984) ("Much of what the Board presently
does is, functionally, rulemaking in adjudicative clothing."). For an early discussion of the rulemaking and adjudication terminology, see generally Ginnane,
"Rule Making'" "Adjudication"and Exemptions Under the AdministrativeProcedure Act, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 621 (1947).
18. The APA defines "rulemaking" in tautological fashion as an "agency process for
formulating, amending or repealing a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1982). A "rule" is
defined as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy." Id. at § 551(4).
The APA provides for two types of rulemaking. Informal rulemaking provides for prior notice and an opportunity for interested persons to submit written
positions and data. There need be no opportunity afforded for oral testimony.
Formal rulemaking is quite analogous to adjudication, with adversarial hearings.
Formal rulemaking is mandated when "rules are required by statute to be made
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." Id. at §§ 553(c), 556-57.
See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972). Rulemaking has been described as "the issuance of regulations or the making of determinations which are
addressed to indicated but un-named and unspecified persons or situations .... "
Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. REv. 259, 265
(1938). Administrative agency rulemaking is the equivalent of agency legislation.
In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908), the Court distinguished adjudication and legislation:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist ....
Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all
or some part of those subject to its power.
19. Note, Administrative Lawmaking Through Adjudication: The National Labor
Relations Board, 45 MINN. L. REV. 609, 641 (1961).

19861

HARMONY IN LABOR JURISPRUDENCE

administrative agency utilize rulemaking and adjudication as its pri2
mary instruments. '
Traditionally, the NLRB has utilized case adjudication, rather than
rulemaking, to make law and policy changes. 22 Despite express statutory rulemaking ability conferred upon the Board by the NLRA,23 the
Board has resorted to rulemaking on only a few occasions in its history. A Nevertheless, critics dissatisfied with the political choices evident through NLRB adjudication have periodically advocated
administrative rulemaking as the more reasoned, informed process to
formulate and to change NLRB precedent and policy. 25 Prestigious
20. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-76 (1982).
21. The abstract definitions of "rule," "rulemaking," and "adjudication" set forth in
the APA are counterproductive to understanding how these agency law and policy making processed actually operate. Bernstein, The NLRBs Adjudication Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 79 YALE L.J.

571, 610-20 (1970).
22. Note, supra note 19.
23. Section 6 of the NLRA provides that: "The Board shall have authority from time
to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedures Act], such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
24. Menard & DiGiovanni, NLRB JurisidictionOver Colleges and Universities: A
Pleafor Rulemaking, 16 WM.& MARY L. REV. 599, 614 (1975).
25. Berger, RetroactiveAdministrativeDecisions,115 U. PA. L. REv. 371 (1967); Bierman, Judge Posnerand the _NLRB; Implicationsfor LaborLaw Reform, 69 MINN.
L. Rsv. 881 (1985); Bernstein, supra note 20; Chesrow, NLRB PolicyMaking: The
Rulemaking - Adjudication Delimma Revisited in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 29
U. MIAMI L. REV. 559 (1975); Bierman, Reflections on the Problem of LaborBoard
Instability, 62 DENy. U. L. REv. 551 (1985); Estreicher, supra note 4, at 10-1;
Fuchs, Agency Developments of Policy Through Rulemaking, 59 Nw. U.L. REv.
781 (1965); Gomberg & Samoff, Improving Administrative Effectiveness of the
NLRB, 24 LAB. L.J. 201 (1973); Kahn, The NLRB and HigherEducation: The Failure ofPolcymaking Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. REv. 63 (1973); Katz &
Jaffe, Doff The Black Robes!, 3 LAB. L.J. 743 (1952); Menard & DiGiovanni, supra
note 23; Peck, A Critiqueof the NationalLaborRelations Board'sPerformancein
Policy Formatulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Peck, A Critique of the NLRB]; Peck, The Atrophied
Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Peck, Atrophied Rule-Making]; Samoff, What Lies
Ahead for the NLRB?, 25 LAB. L.J. 408, 414 (1974); Samoff, Coping with the
NLRB's Growing Caseload, 22 LAB. L.J. 739 (1971); Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78
HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965); Siliverman, The Casefor the National LaborRelations
Board's Use of Rulemaking in Asserting Jurisdiction,35 LAB. L.J. 607 (1974);
Summers, Politics,Policymakingand the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93,105-106
(1954); Note, Rule-Making and Adjudication in AdministrativePolicy-Making:
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 11 B.C.L. REv. 64 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Administrative Policy-Making]. For articles favoring adjudication, see Note,
supra note 19, at 656; Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Policy Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89 YALE L.J. 982 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, NILRB
Rulemaking].
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Bar committees, 26 scholars,27 congressional panels,28 Board members, 29 and unsuccessful labor law reform legislation 3o have all periodically supported efforts to persuade the Board to utilize the
rulemaking process and to forego Board adjudication.
The contention is that rulemaking insures more careful agency deliberation. There is also opportunity for more informed input into the
agency's decision process from a much broader spectrum of potentially
affected persons.3 1 In rulemaking, the agency more closely resembles
a legislature than a court.
In the typical rulemaking, after notice of proposed rulemaking is
published in the Federal Register, 32 all interested persons are invited
to supply information to the agency. 33 Tentative rules are then formulated and published,34 and the agency invites further comment by
interested persons prior to deliberation and promulgation of final, formal rules. 35 Absent compelling extenuating circumstances, there is a
further thirty day period following publication of the rules in the Fed26. In 1958, the American Bar Association Labor Law Section recommended to the
NLRB that it bring several important decisional policies within the rulemaking
requiements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 1958 ABA COMM. ON NLRB
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PROCEEDINGS 116, 121; 42 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 482,
513 (1958).
27. See supra notes 2 & 25.
28. See Hearings on CongressionalOversight of Independent Administrative Agencies Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 916-918 (1968); BACKLOG, supra note 7.
29. See supra note 3.
30. The Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (reprinted in 123
CONG. REC. 23,720 (1977)), would have provided for NLRB rulemaking regarding
bargaining unit determinations, voter eligibility, and organizer access to employer
property. The legislation was passed by the House, but was defeated by Senate
filibuster.
31. Menard & DiGiovanni, supra note 24, at 616; Peck, Atrophied Rule-Making,
supra note 25, at 757 ("[A]n agency which views as its role the formulation of
policy solely upon an ad hoc basis may neglect entirely to seek the advice and
comments of other interested parties in making a decision of momentous importance.. . . the NLRB's rule or policy formulating procedures have suffered from
a lack of public participation, the value of which even the Board has recently
recognized.").
32. The notice shall include:
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or the substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues invovled.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982).
33. Id.
34. Id. at § 552(b).
35. Id. at §§ 552-53. The APA does not require an adversarial hearing, nor is the
agency compelled to receive oral testimony in informal rulemaking. As long as
the agency affords interested persons an opportunity "to participate in the rule-
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eral Register until they become finally effective.3 6 Failure to comply
with these general rulemaking structures of the APA can result in the
invalidation of the promulgated rule.37 Proponents of rulemaking
consequently maintain that the Board would not be able to make cavalier, precipitous changes in NLRB legal precedent and in policy, as has
sometimes occurred in case adjudication.3 8
Proponents also argue that rulemaking would be a more stable
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments," the APA is
satisfied.
36. Id. at §553(d).
37. The APA requires the reviewing court to 'old unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions [which are]... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. at §706(2)(A). For discussion of the various positions of the courts, see Peck, Atrophied Rule-Making,
supra note 25, at 754-55.
38. The most recent, aggravated example of repeated reversal of prior case precedent
by the Board involves factual misrepresentations during election campaigns. See
Midland Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982), overruling General Knit of Cal., 239
N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977), overruling Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B.
1311 (1977), overruling Hollywood Ceramics Company, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 221
(1962). For representative scholarly commentary on Midland Insurance, see
Comment, A Look at the Revolving NLRB Policies Governing Union Representation Election Campaigns,19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 417 (1983). These paroxysms
of Board policy reversals were excoriated by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit:
[Tihe parties [were] unaware of the extent of the Board's fickleness....
[Tihe Board announced in a footnote that the new rule would apply to all
pending cases.... [B]y twice during this proceeding changing its mind
as to the applicable standard the Board has put Mosey [the employer]
through the hoops, subjecting it to protracted legal expense and uncertainty... [due to] the Board's inability to decide what standard to use in
policing elections - it has changed its collective mind three times in the
last five and a half years....
Mosey Mfg. Co. v. NRLB, 701 F.2d 610, 612-13 (7th Cir. 1983). Judge Posner's
vitriolic criticism of the Board's repeated reversals of its own precedent highlights perfectly Professor Estreicher's observation that "courts are reluctant to
pay little more than lip service to the doctrine of deference to agency policymaking - sustaining the Board only if they agree with the agency's policy judgment,
denying enforcement when policy preferences diverge - when the agency appears to take so cavalier a view of its own established rules." Estreicher, supra
note 17, at 143.
Other recent pointed criticisms of the NLRB by the circuit courts of appeals
have occurred in the District of Columbia and in the Third Circuit. In Yellow
Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 383 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court
criticized the Board's "illogical and cryptic conclusions?' The Third Circuit recently stated that "Supreme Court precedent, Board precedent and common
sense all militate against the Board's decision.. . which borders on the whimsical." New Jersey Bell Telephone, 720 F.2d 789, 792 (3rd Cir. 1983). NLRB Chair
Dotson has indicated that the Board may now finally render decisions consonant
with the courts of appeals. Where the circuits have "squarely rejected" NLRB
decisions, the Board will now conform and back away from its previous "sometimes outright defiance of court decisions, with which they have become impatient.... It makes no sense for the NLRB to thumb its nose at the courts." Case
Backlog, supra note 8, at 188. See also Zimmerman & Dunn, Relations Between
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guide to labor and managment.3 9 Adjudication allegedly has the serious structural weakness of being far more vulnerable to frantic, diametrically opposed, ill-reasoned reversals in policy based on an
isolated case, without the benefit of prior consultation with employers
and unions.40 In a few sentences in a single case,4 ' adjudication allows
the Board to undo precedent that may have been carefully developed
for several years. 42 Rulemaking usually operates only prospectively,
while adjudication can have retroactive effect.43 Retroactive policy

changes can burden the parties in the immediate adjudication. They
may have relied in good faith upon prior established NLRB law, only
to have it reversed unexpectedly. 44 Adjudication is more likely to
prove deleterious to the process-oriented, gradual evolution in the law
and in policy that is fostered by more deliberate rulemaking.45 Well-

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.
45.

the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals: A Tale of Acrimony and Accommodation, 8
EMp. REL. L.J. 4 (1982).
Peck, AtrophiedRule-Making, supranote 25, at 759 ("Formalized rules, of course,
provide more definite guides to conduct."); Peck, A Critique of the NLRA, supra
note 25, at 272. Of course, the purported advantages of the greater stability and
certainty of rulemaking "assume[s] that the Board will utilize the rulemaking
procedure effectively. If the Board holds a rulemaking hearing, for example, but
does not carefully study the views of those who contribute them, the advantage of
a variety of viewpoints is nullified." Bernstein, supra note 21, at 593.
Professor Estreicher has stated that: "[P]ublic participation in Board policy
would reduce.., the 'ivory tower syndrome'. ... The rulemaking format forces
a dialogue between agency and public..... Estreicher, supra note 17, at 143. Cf.
Note, supra note 19, at 637 ("Although statements have been made to the effect
that administrative agencies are not bound by the principle of stare decisis to the
same extent as the courts, an examination of actual practice, especially in the
National Labor Relations Board, has revealed a strong tendency to follow prior
holdings and such holdings themselves have been phrased so as to command future application.")
One commentator has cited an example of the Board effecting "an important
change of policy, [regarding § 8b7 picketing] totally irrelevant to the case being
decided," via footnote. Peck, A Critique of the NLRB, supra note 25, at 256.
See supra note 37. But see Note NLRB Rulemaking, supra note 25, at 995. The
Board's ability to change policy in a few sentences in a single case has also been
regarded as an advantage: "adjudication permits major policy changes to be made
with little or no exaplanation." Id
Peck, A Critique of the NLRB, supra note 25, at 273, ("One of the most serious
adverse effects of using the adjudicatory process for policy formulation is, of
course, the retroactive effect upon parties who ligitimately relied upon the former rules."); Chesrow, supra note 25, at 572. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194 (1947). Sometimes the retroactive effect of adjudication is justified, according
to the Court in Chenery, because "the mischief of producing a result which is
contrary to a statutory design or to legal or equitable principles... [is] greater
than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard." Id. at 203.
The Board recently acknowledged the difficulties posed for the parties by the
retroactive effect of new rules articulated via NLRB adjudication. Our Way, Inc.,
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1009 (1983). See also supra note 38.
Chesrow, supra note 25, at 572. See also supra note 38.
See supra note 38.
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reasoned policy is contingent upon prior careful consideration of a
wide congeries of variables that usually cannot be fully assessed in the
more ad hoc adjudicatory forum. Adjudication may fail to consider
the many possible ramifications of intially narrow single interest issues that ultimately transcend the immediate controversy. 46 Many of
these criticisms of adjudication are certainly well founded. However,
on balance, even expedited 47 rulemaking does not offer sufficiently
greater advantages to warrant displacement of continued Board
adjudication.
A.

NLRB Adjudication and the Politics of Labor Law

While rulemaking has certain legitimate administrative advantages, it is premised on theories that do not fully apply in labor law.
Rulemaking does not adequately comport with the reality of purposely politicized administrative agencies. This is especially true in
the case of the NLRB.48 Rulemaking would unwisely depoliticize the
NLRB. 49 The Board would be vitiated rather than stabilized. The
Board was consciously designed from its inception as a politically responsive agency.5 0 By providing for Presidential appointment of the
five Board members to staggered terms, Congress intended the Board
to reflect, at least indirectly, the labor relations philosophy of the ap46. K. DAvis, AD
1NasTRATvE LAw § 6.03, at 142 (1972); Menard & DiGiovanni,
supra note 24, at 616.
47. Section 6 of the NLRA would require only informal "notice and comment"
rulemaking, since it did not mandate "on the record" formal rulemaking. 5
U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).

48. See, eq., Peck, Atrophied Rule-Making, supra note 25:
Very few persons active or interested in the labor area are likely to have
been misled by the absence of rules in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Complications of substantive law are necessarily so complex that the desire for a simple code intelligible to the untrained layman must be abandoned as unrealistic.
Id. at 760.
49. Id. at 760. Note, NLRB Rulemaking, supra note 25, at 986 "[Pjroponents of
NLRB rulemaking argue that rulemaking serves as a political check on agency
power.").
50. Even some proponents of rulemaking recognize the positive attributes of the inherently political nature of the NLRB. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra, note 17:
Congress intended the Board to engage in 'experimental decision making' to fill in the gaps in the statutory scheme when it passed the Act.
"thisfreedom was thought desirable becasue the legislators could not
agree on important aspects of the scheme.., and therefore had to delegate a significant policymaking role to the agency'... Congress wanted
the Board to be able to experiment with its policies, to see how they
work in the 'real world', and then refine or abandon the rule in light of
actual experience.
Id. at 143.
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pointing President.5 1 Presidential appointment is the primary instru52
ment for guaranteeing the Board's political responsiveness.
Ultimately, the Board appointees usually continue to reflect the labor
law philosophy of the appointing President. 5 3 It has, for example,
51. Section 3(a) of the NLRA, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act (LMRA)
provides:
[Tihe Board shall consist of five... members, appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate... for terms of five years
each .... The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Board. Any member of the Board may be removed by the
President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in
office, but for no other cause.
29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
For a particularly cogent synopsis of how and why the NLRB is meant to be
responsive to majoritarian political preferences, see Bernstein, supra note 21, at
575 n.10:
The unavoidable periodic selection of a President enables new majorities
(coalitions of minorities) to obtain political power which carries the authority to make appointments to agencies. These new appointees reflect
the most recent political alignment and, by new policy decisions, ameliorate the rigors of existing legislation. Of course, it can be argued that the
electorate does not vote on transportation, labor, or dozens of other policies when it chooses a President. But in a general way it does. The interest groups usually know the stakes and support those candidates who are
believed well disposed to their interests. The electorate at large knows
the general orientation of the major parties and the presidential candidates, probably more clearly in the area of labor relations than in most.
Hence, they vote for policy changes, albeit within limits set by existing
statutes (which may afford considerable latitude). Thus viewed, the policy shifts of newly-constituted majorities are democratic means of
preventing long-dead majorities from ruling from the grave.
To a large extent, all administrative agencies whose members are subject to presidential appointment are politically responsive. W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 128-44 (1974).
One prominent labor lawyer recently highlighted the positive aspects of thr
NLRB's political flexibility:
[Complaint by labor law practicioners about the 'instability' of Board
rulings are 'not really justified' because Congress intended [the] NLRB
to be a flexible decision maker, most Board policy reversals do not come
as a total surprise, and some Board reversals have 'stabilizing consequences' for labor law and labor relations in the long run.
In short, criticizing the Board because it changes its mind is a little
like criticizing a zebra for its stripes or a leopard for its spots: the Board
is what it is.
Estreicher, supra note 17, at 145. Former NLRB Chair Miller stated that "when
Congress established the Board in this manner it intended to permit changing
administrators to appoint persons more likely to hold social and economic philosophies tending to parallel those of the administration making the appointment."
Defense of NLRB's Performance, 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 103, 104 (June 11,
1984). Former NLRB Chair Murphy said the Board is properly part of the political process and reflects presidential philosophy. Pac fic Coast Labor Law Conference 119 LAB. REL REP. (BNA) 47 (May 20, 1985).
52. Note, NRLB Rulemaking, supra note 25, at 998.
53. See supra note 51. See also Peck, A Critique of the NLRB, supra note 24; Note,
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been asserted that "[a]s public attitudes toward labor relations change,
the NLRB frequently conforms its policies to the new national sentiment."M Board responsiveness to evolving majoritarian politics is a
positive attribute. Labor law is not a rigid, timeless absolute. Rather
than have Congress continually embroiled in frustrating and probably
futile attempts to amend the NLRA, Board flexibility in fluidly developing and changing labor policy is the far more efficacious labor policy
desideratum.5 5
At least as much as any other agency, and perhaps more than most,
the NLRB is inherently and necessarily political in its administrative
lawmaking: "[T]he Board's role has been more than that of an agency
merely fleshing out legislative standards; it has served as a means for
adapting national labor policy to a continually shifting political climate."56 The Board properly is intended to effectuate that function
and therefore does much more than merely apply the original congressional intent.57 The Board is a derivative policy maker, shepherding
the evolution of contemporary labor policy consonant with overarching legislative policy expressed in the Act.58 To adapt Marshall's aph-

54.

55.
56.

57.
58.

The NLRB UnderRepublican Administration. Recent Trends and Their Political
Implications,55 COLUM. L. REv. 852 (1955).
Note, NLRB Rulemaking, supra note 25, at 998. See also Winter, JudicialReview
of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 53, 65
('"The History of the Labor Board amply documents its political
responsiveness.").
Summers, supra note 25, at 100.
Summers states that:
This agency reaction to changes in the political climate is not necessarily
bad. Ought not government, in the making of policies, reflect majority
will? Should not administrative agencies, within the area of discretion
granted them, choose the policy which most accurately expresses the
desires of the majority? To do so is to make democracy more responsive,
an especially significant contribution when government tends to become
remote. It is true that our principal instrument for expressing majority
will is Congress speaking through legislation. However, there is serious
doubt whether Congress is capable of expressing small shifts or gradual
changes. Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act make long
jumps, tending to go beyond the existing balance point of public opinion.
The Board, by bending to the wind can enable the same statutory words
to serve a range of shifts, thus avoiding the necessity of frequent
changes.
Id.
Note, NLRB Rulemaking: PoliticalReality Versus ProceduralFairness,89 YALE
L.J. 982, 988-89 (1980).
Bernstein, supra note 21, at 574 n.10. ("Policy shifts by new majorities effected by
new presidential appointments usually are deplored as unprincipled. I suggest
that, within bounds not readily defined, such process of change is not only justifiable but desirable.") Cf. Petro, supra note 12, at 1128:
[Tihe Board is now and has for many years been substituting its own
policies for those declared by Congress in the National Labor Relations
Act.... Since the Labor Board is an administrative agency, and since
the constitution delegates all policy-making, legislative powers to Con-
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orism regarding the dynamic Constitution, 59 it is a "living" NLRA that
the Board is expounding. Through its core function, the Board
broadly reflects the majoritarian political choices supported by the
particular presidential administration. Through relatively short terms
contingent on Presidential appointment, Congress intended the
NLRB to function not only as a quasi-judicial lawmaker, but also, inevitably and positively, as a political, administrative law maker.
Case adjudication is best suited to enable the Board to implement
majoritarian political philosophy more readily in the process of making and changing law and policy: "A national labor policy that responds quickly to political developments reflects the balance of power
in the industrial relations system." 6 0 Individual cases serve as the vehicles for enunciation of general rules. Proponents of rulemaking
conted that it is a more deliberative and thorough process, which
serves as a better guide to the parties' conduct than does adjudication.
However, if the general rule is riddled with exceptions, it will have no
utility.6 1 Despite some conceptual clumsiness, adjudication has been
firmly established as the Board's functional equivalent of rulemaking.62 Initially, this is seemingly convoluted. The Board routinely
promulgates general rules in the context of an individual case, a process of ad hoc adjudication. 63 The Board thus accomplishes through
adjudication what the purists insist be done only through rulemaking:
the enunciation of broad principles transcending the problems of the
immediate parties. By manipulating the facts of particular cases to
enunciate policy changes, the Board, at least theoretically, lessens the
likelihood of appellate court involvement in labor policy determinations. In the first instance, labor policy evolution should be shaped by
the Board and only then occasionally refined by the courts of appeals
to insure general constancy with the legislative intent of the NLRA.64
It is important to understand that, "[u]nlike a promulgated rule,
which generally represents a firm statement of agency policy that can
gress, a miscarriage of representative government and of the principle of
separation of powers has occurred.
59. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See also 0. W. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAw 1 (1880):
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which

judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than
the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics."
Note, supra note 25, at 999.
Chesrow, supra note 19, at 656-57.
Summers, supra note 25, at 106.
Note, supra note 19, at 656-57.
Note, NLRB Rulemaking,supra note 25, at 990.
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be amended only through new rulemaking proceedings, a rule announced in an adjudicatory preceeding may appear as only a step in
the gradual evolution of a general doctrine." 65 Adjudication enables
more flexibility on the part of the Board. If the new policy proves
unwise, it can be readily overruled by subsequent adjudication. The
lack of flexibility is one of the main reasons why the Board has historically spurned rulemaking, a "cumbersome process of amending substantive rules that necessarily impedes the law's ability to respond
quickly and accurately to changing industrial practices." 66 It is much
more difficult to rescind policy established by rulemaking. In the
often volatile world of labor relations, steady-state is the rare exception.67 Contextual flexibility and responsiveness to political changes
are the key ingredients in labor law,68 even at the cost of occasional
chaos. Adjudication is the better means to safeguard these attributes
of Board dynamism.
If labor law and policy are to have relevance, it is imperative that
the Board have the necessary institutional dynamism to assess "live"
facts in particular controversies and to make the most contextually
appropriate decisions.6 9 The NLRB does not set labor policy in a vacuum. Policy evolution is contingent upon the ability to assess continuously changing facts.7 0 Case adjudication, rather than broad
65. Id. at 996.
66. Hearingson CongressionalOversight of AdminsitrativeAgencies (NationalLaborRelations Board)Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1663 (1968).
67. Note, NLRB Rulemaking, supra note 25, at 988 ('abor relations is one of the
most polarized and controversial subjects of national political debate. It is an area
in which labor and management exert tremendous political pressures in support
of their interests.") Cf.Samoff,' What Lies Ahead for the NLRB?, supra note 25,
at 411 ("We seem to be a steady state, an equilibrium, regarding the law and
agency, and I believe this will continue for some time.")
68. One commentator has stated that:
A foundation of the existence of administrative agencies is flexibility
through discretion. Sometimes the very justification for creation of an
administrative body is that it may exercise discretion in handling individual problems which are difficult to fit within inflexible boundaries laid
down by precedents. Any attempt to impose rules of rigid adherence to
the notion of stare decisis would strike at the basis of agency existence.
Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to AdministrativeDecisions, 59 W.
VA. L. REv. 111, 131 (1957). See also Nathanson, AdministrativeDiscretionin the
Interpretationof Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470,490 (1950).
69. William Feldesman, then Solicitor of the Board, stated.
[L]abor relations problems are better handled in an adjudicatory frame
of reference ... there are many good reasons for proceeding via case by
case adjudication. Perhaps the best one is the "feel" for a problem, the
understanding that comes, when it is dealt with in the ambience of a live
dispute between contesting parties in an industrial communit......
1969 LAB. REL. Y.B. (BNA) 166, 169.
70. Bernstein, supra note 21, at 574-75 ("When the Board does make policy, it should
base its decisions on the realities of industrial relations: Indeed, that was the
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rulemaking, is more conducive to affording this necessary administrative flexibility. Worship of precedent qua precedent, at the expense of
the ability to change policy, would be the most fatal legalism. 71 Thus,
the "vice" of the NLRB being more readily able to reverse precedent
through adjudication rather than to repeal a regulation via much more
cumbersome rulemaking may actually be one of the virtues of adjudication.72 Once promulgated, it is much more difficult to rescind a rule
than to overrule a prior decision. 73 The rule remains in effect until it
is formally repealed. Those opposed to repeal can participate in the
rulemaking proceeding by which the agency proposes to repeal the
prior rule.74 While administrative law purists may be disturbed, political realists recognize that law, policy and politics are inextricably interwoven. Professor Jaffe, a preeminent authority on administrative
law, put it simply: "policymaking is politics."75 The administrative
lawmaking process, whether via rulemaking or adjudication, involves
agency policymaking.76 If adjudication occasionally results in dissatismajor reason for creating the Board. Only thus can it fashion rules of conduct
that promote healthy labor relations and reduce rather than stimulate
litigation.").
71. Judge Learned Hand assessed the tendency of mature administrative agencies to
become increasingly rigid and calcified and reluctant to change their own
precedents:
But I believe that the history of commissions is very largely this: when
they start, the are filled with enthusiasts, and they are flexible and adaptive. Like all of us ... after they have proceeded a while they get their
own set of precedents, and precedents save 'the intolerable labor of
thought,' and they fall into grooves ... When they get into grooves, then
God save you to get them out of the grooves.
L. HAND,THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 241-42 (1952). Professor Summers made partic-

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

ularly pointed similar comments regarding the mistaken sentiments of some
Board members to eschew political choice in favor of some unreal, abstract, and
purely neutral lawmaking
Just as an agency can be valuable because it may be responsive, it can be
dangerous because it is not responsible. Members, once appointed and
vested with power may become self-certain in their own judgments as to
what is wise policy and become insensitive to majority will. They stand
outside the mainstream of political pressures and may fail to sense accurately changes in public opinion. If they make policy case by case they
may obscure the developing pattern and thus avoid the crystalizing of
opinion. By asserting their independence and denying that they are legislating, they may deflect justified criticism. This irresponsibility need
not be intentional, but may be mere misjudgment or failure to understand the place of such an agency within a democratic structure. In any
case, there is an ever present threat that irresponsible agencies may impede or frustrate the process of self-government.
Summers, supra note 25, at 100-01.
Shapiro, supra note 25, at 942-47.
Peck, A Critique of the NLRB, supra note 25, at 273.
Chesrow, supra note 25, at 574.
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 22 (1965).
Chesrow, supra note 25, at 559 ("Policymaking is a vital function of an administrative agency. In general, administrative law is primarily a process of poli-
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fying, seemingly unprincipled reversals in Board precedent, any truly
radical aberrations will prove self correcting via the Board's
majoritarian political barometer. This is partially complemented by
7
the institution of judicial review3
On balance, therefore, reformers calling for abandonment of adjudication in favor of rulemaking have an unreal, pristine devotion to
the abstract theoretical niceties of administrative law. Those who call
periodically for Board rulemaking are usually those dismayed with
NLRB decisions currently adverse to their own labor law and political
preferences. Predictably enough, they see rulemaking as an instrument to dampen the politics of the NLRB. Real world labor relations
cannot, however, brook calcification of the Board's effective policymaking instruments. Some critics want to deprive the Board of any
meaningful ability to make policy. They see the Board as illegitimately usurping Congress' power to make and to change labor policy.
By advocating a static view of rulemaking, they would render the
Board unable to change policy.
There is certainly no question that the Board has frequently
cymaking in the administration of legislative authority delegated to the agency in
order to enable it to govern a particular sector of society which Congress has
recognized as requiring regulation.")
77. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488 (1951). The Court stated:
"The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record
fairly detracts from its weight." Id. at 491. This landmark case established that if
evidence relied on by the Board is reasonably credible, even in the presence of
contrary evidence, the Board decision must be allowed to stand, even if the reviewing court would have reached a different substantive decision on the underlying merits. The court can displace the Board's factual determinations only
when they have no reasonable support in the evidence: '"is
court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to
have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied." Id.
Section 10(e) of the NLRA sets forth the standard to be applied by the courts
in judicial appellate review of NLRB decisions:
The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported
by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive.... If the rule is arbitrary, inflexible or impossible of application to all similar situations under the exigencies of changing conditions
or peculiar fact situations, there is ever present the check of judicial review, which brings to the administrative decision the perspective that
the specialist may lack.
Note, supra note 19, at 657. For general discussions of standards and practice of
judicial review of administrative agency decisions, see generally Jaffe, Judicial
Review: Question of Law, 69 HARv. L. REV. 239 (1955) ("[IThe administrative and
the judiciary share the role of law pronouncing and law making. They are in
partnership. The court may supersede the administrative and itself determine
the question of law; it is the senior partner ....
"). See also Rothman, The National Labor Relations Board and AdministrativeLaw, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
301, 311-16 (1960). For a compendium of significant cases where the courts have
checked the Board's policy-making, see Peck, A Critiqueof the NLRB, supranote
25, at 259 n.41.
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changed policy, usually reflecting changes in Board appointments by
different Presidents.78 But depoliticization of the Board would frustrate rather than further congressional intent. Efficiency and political
expediency would be unwisely sacrificed for the cumbersome baggage
of achieving ultimately illusory consensus through rulemaking. Board
resolution of disputes would stultify, and the already serious backlog
would quickly result in total administration chaos. Admittedly,
rulemaking is not counter-majoritarian. An argument can be made
that, by its more deliberate processes, rulemaking is ultimately more
democratic and politically responsive to the deeper majoritarian
sentiments. 79
However, rulemaking is much less able to respond to current political choices that must be made by Board members.8 0 Further,
rulemaking is also subject to manipulation and influence by special
interest groups. By rulemaking, the Board could lose its quasi-judicial
lawmaking character, and instead be perverted into an agency issuing
advisory opinions. Labor relations law is essentially an adversarial
system, demanding resolution of actual controversies, rather than a
referee for rulemaking debates and solicitation for comments ad infinitum in the Federal Register.
The choice of adjudication over rulemaking is not a radical winlose proposition. Rulemaking does have many assets; but adjudication
has more. There are a number of factors to be evaluated in choosing
whether to proceed by adjudication or by rulemaking.81 Regardless of
78. Peck, supra note 25.
79. Note, NLRB Rulemaking, supra note 25, at 1000. ("Rulemaking is more democratic than adjudication because it requires agencies to issue their rules with
greater clarity and specificity, and permits the participation of all interested
parties.").
80. Some Board members, including former chair Guy Farmer, disavowed the NLRB
role of making majoritarian political choices in their decision-making.
Our job is to administer the law as written and as intended by Congress,
and to do this with meticulous impartiality ... The only proper function of the Board is to enforce the statutory remedies whenever they are
invoked with scrupulous fairness, and let the chips fall where they may.
We are not authorized to make labor policy; we enforce a specific statute
and that is all.
Farmer, The NLRB: Its Pas Presen and Future,23 TENN. L. REV. 112,115 (1984)
It is impossible to administer the law with "meticulous impartiality." The
consequences of NLRB policy choices will favor either management or labor.
Summers, supra note 25, at 97 ("The critical issues before the Board represent
underlying disputes between unions and management. No matter how the Board
decides these issues, it cannot avoid aiding one and hindering the other. Impartiality is impossible.").
81. Profesor Peck suggested some of the more important factors in the litany of considerations whether to utilize adjudication or rulemaking in policy
determinations:
Among them are the nature of the problem presented, the information
available concerning that problem, the practicability of formulating from
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whether rulemaking or adjudication is employed, administrative lawmaking by the Board has never been a paragon of jurisprudential clarity.82 On balance, however, adjudication is far more consonant with
the congressional intent that the Board be flexible and politically responsive. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed
the ability of the NLRB to continue to utilize adjudication rather than
rulemaking. Despite some earlier equivocation,8 3 the Court has
strongly endorsed Board adjudication. Adjudication insures that the
Board will remain a politically responsive agency, reflecting
majoritarian choices in relatively timely fashion:
The Board could not fulfill its function without the concomitant power to formulate policy. We should not question whether the Board may make law
through adjudication, for to establish a tribunal and subsequently wonder
whether it may properly develop a body of precedents and rules is to create a
paradox. 8 4

As the following brief review of the salient Supreme Court decisions will illustrate, the technical debate over the relative merits of
rulemaking or adjudication to set law and policy obfuscates the more
important, fundamental point. Both adjudication and rulemaking are
legitimate aspects of the administrative policy and lawmaking process.
Above all else, the NLRB is a policy setter and lawmaker, charged
with continuously formulating an evolving labor law consonant with
that information a principle of general applicability, the advantages to
the public gained from promulgation of definitive guides, the necessity of
speed in the disposition of problems, the desirability of avoiding retroactive changes of law, and the soundness or justice of the policy as developed in one manner or another. Such an exercise of judgment produces
no black and white distinctions; it yields instead results which are entitled to respect only as the produce of an informed discretion.
Peck, supra note 25, at 755. See also Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach Which Should It Be?, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 658 (1957); Robinson, The Making of Adminsitrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication
and AdminsistrativeProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 529 (1970).
82. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947) ("If we were obligated
to depend upon adminsitrative interpretation for light in finding the meaning of
the statute, the inconsistency of the Board's decisions would leave us in the
dark").
83. NRLB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). For commentary on the case,
see Bernstein, supra note 20. See also McDonald, The Wyman-Gordon Case: A
Second Look at the NRB's ExcelsiorRule, 20 LAB. L.J. 599 (1969); Young, Review
of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 55 A.B.A. J. 674, 679 (1969); Note, The
Supreme Cour4 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 220 (1969); Note, NLRB V. Wyman-Gordon Co.: Subsequent Retroactive Application of ProstpectivelyPromulgated DecisionalRule Approved by High Court, 24 Sw. L.J. 378 (1970).
In Wyman, the Court held that the Board rule, announced in Excelsior Underwear,156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), requiring the employer to furnish the NLRB
regional director with a list of employee names and addresses eligible to vote in
an ordered representation election, was procedurally inappropriate as a means of
establishing a general rule of future applicability.
84. Note, supra note 19, at 656.
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the broad policy provisions of the NLRA.85 Rather than attempt an
artificial abstract prioritization of adjudication over rulemaking, it is
more important to appreciate that they are positively related in the
broader administrative process. 86 Only when this is fully realized can
analysis of the distinctions prove fruitful.8 7 The final pragmatic balance militates strongly in favor of adjudication, which is most consonant with real world labor relations.
Those who argue persuasively for NLRB rulemaking limited to
highly specialized areas or used for policy making only place the inquiry on a slippery slope.88 To some degree, virtually every labor law
decision implicates policy considerations and influences policy evolution. While rulemaking could be productively used in some esoteric
areas,8 9 the dangers it would pose for Board flexibility would probably
not be worth the risk. Continued Board adjudication, stabilized by the
proposed federal labor court of appeals rather than by the speculative
virtues of rulemaking, is the better alternative.
B.

Pertinent Supreme Court Decisions Regarding NLRB Adjudication

In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,90 the Court criticized sharply the
Board's deviance from the rulemaking procedures of the APA. The
purpose of the APA is to assure agency fairness and mature consideration in the formulation of general rules. The NLRB could not disregard these APA constraints by purporting to make rules via
adjudication. 9 ' The Court implied that rulemaking rather than adjudication might be required in some future cases.92 In Wyman, six Jus85. Summers states that:

ITlhe National Labor Relations Board, like many other administrative
agencies, is a lawmaking body. It can and must legislate. It cannot be
impartial. Every decision represents a choice as to a rule or policy in an
area of conflicting interests and opposing views. Protestations by members of the Board but conceal the true nature of their tasks. The test of

the Board is not whether it has legislated or whether it has been impartial, but whether its legislation has been responsible and whether its partiality is that commanded by the statute.
Summers, supra note 25, at 107.

86. Peck, supra note 25, at 734 ("Though the definitions of the Administrative Procedure Act might suggest otherwise, rule-making and adjudication do not constitute
separate, distinct and unblendable aspects of governmental activity;, on the contrary, upon occasions they are inseparable and merged aspects of the same
problem.").
87. Id. at 734-35. For further discussion of the differences between rulemaking and
adjudication, see Bernstein, supra note 21, at 610-20.
88. See supra note 3.
89. Id.
90. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
91. Id. at 764.
92. Both the plurality and dissenting opinions in Wyman indicated displeasure with
Board adjudication rather than rule making-
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tices stated that the Board should use rulemaking when promulgating
new standards. 93 The Board briefly conformed to the judicial signal,
and engaged in substantive rulemaking on a few rare occasions in the
immediate wake of Wyman. 94 But the Court never followed through
with the implications of Wyman,9 5 and NLRB general rule promulga96
tion via ad hoc case adjudication soon resumed without interruption.
The cryptic Wyman decision was an isolated counter to the Court's
other decisions endorsing agency choice of adjudication rather than
rulemaking.97 The Wyman Court did not force the NLRB to choose
The rule-making provisions of...

[the Administrative Procedure] Act

• . .were designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of rules
of general application .... They may not be avoided by the process of

93.

94.

95.

96.

97.

making rules in the course of adjudicatory proceedings. There is no warrant in law for the Board to replace the statutory scheme with a rulemaking procedure of its own invention.
Id. (Fortas, J., plurality opinion). Justice Harlan, in turn, stated: "[I]t
is precisely
in these situations, in which established patterns of conduct are revolutionized,
that rule-making procedures perform [their] vital functions...." Id. at 781
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 762-66, 775-83. However, the Court failed to indicate how the NLRB is to
determine when rulemaking is appropriate: "[B]oth the reasoning and the consequences of Wyman-Gordon are as unintelliglble as they are unclear... Wyman-Gordon poses more questions than it answers." Bernstein, supra note 21, at
604.
The rules set out at 29 C.F.R. § 103 (1970), marked one rare occasion when the
Board utilized rulemaking to assert jurisdiction over private colleges and universities with gross annual revenues of at least one million dollars. Likewise by
rulemaking, the Board asserted jurisdiction over symphony orchestras with gross
annual revenues of at least one million dollars. See 38 Fed. Reg. 6176-77 (1972); 37
Fed. Reg. 16813 (1972). For discussion of the Board's earlier history with a convoluted sort of rulemaking, see Peck, supra,note 25. There have been a few other
insignificant instances of the Board's use of rulemaking. However, the Board has
historically established jurisdictional standards by adjudication rather than by
rulemaking. See Note, supra note 19, at 636 n.149. Despite subsequent identification of several other substantive areas suited for clarification by rulemaking, such
as unit determinations and time limitations matters, NLRB rulemaking has been
entirely dormant for at least a decade. CHAIRAN's TAsK FORcE ON THE NLRB
FOR 1976 30-32 (1976).
For discussion of the NLRB's last experience with rulemaking over a decade
ago, see Silverman, The Casefor the National Labor Relations Board's Use of
Rulemaking in Asserting Jurisdiction,25 LAB. L.J. 607 (1974).
Note, Administrative PolicyMaking, supra note 25, at 73. ('"The effect of Wyman-Gordon is ambiguous because the Court enforced the Board's order against
Wymen-Gordon while holding that the rule upon which the order was based was
invalid.").
Board policy determinations via ad hoc adjudications had been firmly established
in NLRB jurisprudence prior to Wyman. See, e.g., American Potash & Chemical
Corp., 107 N.R.L.B. 1418 (1954) (Board rule established via adjudication governing craft severance); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953) (the Board
established the 24 hour captive audience election rule to be applied to all future
cases).
There are a few pre-Wyman cases where the Supreme Court expressed misgivings with the Board's purported promulgation of per se rules through adjudica-
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rulemaking over adjudication in any particular situation. It did not
interfere with agency discretion. In a much narrower vein, the Court
sent a mixed signal that when enunciation of broad policy was appropriate, the NLRB should (but was apparently not mandated to) follow
the rulemaking requisites of the APA.98 As one commentator has
summarized: "As a practical matter Wyman-Gordon may mean no
more than that the Board can continue to make 'rules' without
rulemaking and can compel unwilling parties to comply if it goes
through an adjudicatory proceeding." 99
In the landmark cases of SEC v. Chenery Corp.,100 the Court had
earlier held that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was
not bound by prior judicial construction of equitable principles regarding a fiduciary's duty of fair dealing. The SEC was able to apply a
standard that it articulated for the first time in the immediate adjudicative proceeding. There was no need for the SEC to have first formulated a prior general rule. The Court deemed that the agency was able
tion. See Local 357, Int'l. Bd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), is a postWyman case that reiterated the Court's preference for rulemaking, and cited Wyman for support. In Morton, the Court held that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
was required to comply with APA rulemaking to establish a general assistance
eligibility requirement. However, two months after Morton, the Court issued its
decision in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). In Bell, the Court
ignored Morgon and Wyman, and reaffirmed the principles of SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), which endorsed the Board's largely untrammelled discretion to utilize adjudication rather than rulemaking.
98. Justice Harlan would have sent a clearer message. He would not have countenanced confusion of adjudication and rulemaking under the guise of agency discretion: "One cannot always have the best of both worlds. Either the rulemaking
provisions are to be enforced or they are not." NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759, 781 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. Bernstein, supra note 20, at 603.
100. 332 U.S. 194 (1947); 318 U.S. 80 (1943). For commentary on these cases, see Forman, The Role of the Courts in Effecting AdministrativeResponsibility,22 TEMP.
L.Q. 300 (1949); Comment, Ad Hoc Action by AdministrativeAgencies, 2 ARK. L.
REv. 439 (1948); Comment, The Promulgationof Standardsof Conductas a Guide
to AdministrativeDeterminations- The Chenery Cases, 28 B.U.L. RE'v. 216 (1948);
Comment, Administrative Law - Proprietyof OrderAnnouncing and Applying
New Principle - Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Order, 33 IowA L.
REF. 558 (1948); Comment, Establishment of Employment Relationships by Collective Agreement, 15 U. CHi. L. REV. 716, 728 (1948); Comment, Administrative
Law: A New Basisfor Quasi-JudicialDecisions: Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 288 (1948); Note, SECv. Chenery Corp.: A
Case Study in Administrative Technique, 62 HARV. L. REV. 478 (1949); Note, AdministrativeLaw - Ad Hoc Rulemaking - Retroactive Rulemaking, 8 LA. L. REV.
576 (1948); Note, Administrative Law - Scope of Judical Review - Deference to
Administrative Choice of Method, 26 TEx. L. REv. 525 (1948); Note, Administrative Law - Judicial Deference to Administrative Experience - Evolution of Standards by Ad Hoc Administrative Orders, 1 VAND. L. REV. 118 (1947); Note,
PermissibleScope of Stockholder Proposalsunder SEC Proxy Rules, 57 YALE L.J.
874, 881 (1948).
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to derive its own standards based on the agency's special administrative competence.1O' Regardless of whether the agency utilized adjudication or rulemaking, it remained essential that the administrative
lawmaking be rationally based in order to be upheld upon subsequent
judicial review.1 02 The Court indicated a general preference for
rulemaking, but realized that adjudication was often better suited to
dealing with unpredictable exigencies. The Court indicated that the
choice of adjudication or rulemaking was left to the administrative
agency's informed discretion, depending on the agency's assessment of
how it could best fulfill its mandate.1 03 Especially when the agency
makes policy, the Court indicated it will defer to the agency.104 The
uniqueness of particular facts especially militate in favor of agency
lawmaking adjudication. As the Court summarized in ChZenery:
[Problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably forsee problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with
a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard
and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as
to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those
situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the problem on a caseto-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. 1 0 5

These established administrative law principles of judicial deference to the agency decision whether to employ adjudication or
rulemaking is especially appropriate in the case of the NLRB. The
NLRA is largely a loose statutory amalgam of semantic terms of
art.106 The NLRA is not designed to cover automatically the "infinite
101. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92-93 (1943).
102. Id. at 94-95.
103. "[A]n administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by
individual order. There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution
of statutory standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule
or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency." Id. at 202-03. See also NLRB v. Penn Cork &

Closures, Inc., 376 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. A.P.W. Prod. Co., 316 F.2d 899,
905 (2nd Cir. 1963) ("[Whether to use one method of lawmaking or the other is a
question of judgment, not of power").
104. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344,349 (1953) ("'[Tihe relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.
') (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)).
105. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
106. Several commentators have corroborated the NLRB's unenviable task of wrestling with the often cryptic, Delphic language of the NLRA. See, e.g., Friendly,
The Federal AdministrativeAgencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards,75 HARV.L. REv. 863, 891 (1962) ("An agency that has done much to translate the general words of its charter into more specific guides for behavior by the
regulated and decision by the regulators is the National Labor Relations Board.)";
Winter, supra note 53, at 56-60, 65; Note, NLRB Rulemaking, supranote 24, at 988
('"The NLRB thus has had to apply statutes with often cryptic and conflicting
legislative guidance."). See also Jaffe, Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV.858 (1963).
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combination of events"'107 in the complex and constantly fluid world of
labor relations. Therefore, the NLRB, charged with interpreting and
administering the Act, must be vested with the necessary administrative flexibility and discretion to choose the most efficacious mode of
administrative lawmaking.108
On the heels of the equivocal Wyman decision, the Second Circuit
held that the appellate court had the power to usurp the NLRB's
choice of rulemaking or adjudication. Further, the court of appeals
could compel the Board to implement the law and policy-making instrument chosen by the court. 0 9 The appellate court's decision was
reversed by the Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co." 0 While the
Court was split on the substantive labor law aspeect of Bell,11 it rebuffed unanimously the Second Circuit on the germane administrative
aspect of the case.1 12
The Bell Court unequivocally reaffirmed its landmark Chenery decision, and held that "the Board is not precluded from announcing
new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the
107. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
108.
[I]n the nature of things Congress could not catalogue all the devices and
stratagems for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could it define
the whole gamut of remedies of effectuate these policies in an infinite
variety of specific situations. Congress met these difficulties by leaving
the adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of administration.
The exercise of the process was committed to the Board, subject to limited judical review.
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). See also Rothman, supra
note 76, at 308-09:
One of the major reasons for the creation of administrative agencies was
the inability of conventional legislative and judicial procedures to handle
the complexities involved in regulating an industry or a particular type
of economic or social activity. The significant thing about the Board's
task is that, in some areas, Congress has even left to it the delicate function of making an accommodation between conflicting interests.
109. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2nd Cir. 1973). Although the Second
Circuit endorsed NLRB rulemaking rather than adjudication in Bell, Judge
Friendly had earlier recognized the positive features of NLRB adjudication. H.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:
DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 36-52 (1962).

THE NEED FOR BETTER

110. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). For further commentary on the case, see Chesrow, supra
note 24; Note, Labor Law, 24 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 118 (1974); Note, Rulemaking
or Adjudication in Administrative Policy Formation: Rock versus Hard Place?,
113 DUQUESNE L. REV. 967 (1975); Note, The Supreme Court 1973 Term - Labor
Law - Exclusion of ManagerialEmployeesfrom the NationalLaborRelations Act,
88 HARV. L. REV. 258 (1974); Note, Labor Law - OrganizationalRights of ManagerialEmployees, 53 N.C. L. REV. 809 (1975).
111. By a five to four vote, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit decision on the substantive labor law principle that "managerial" persons, and not merely those involved in labor relations, were excluded from the coverage of the NLRA.
112. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
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Board's discretion."113 The Court did caution the Board in dictum
that adjudication may be inappropriate when its retroactive effect
would have significant adverse impact on parties' reliance on past established law.1'4 As the Court pointed out, "rulemaking would provide the Board with a forum for soliciting the informed views of those
15
affected in industry and labor before embarking on a new course."1
But, after Bell, NLRB adjudication under the particular facts would
have to constitute a gross abuse of discretion in order to be vitiated by
the Court.116 Bell marked the last occasion that the Court significantly addressed the Board's preference for adjudication over
rulemaking. It is this misunderstood judicial caveat that has again resurfaced to fuel recent, renewed criticisms of NLRB decision-making
via adjudication as being inappropriately politicized.
Neither adjudication nor rulemaking has absolute advantages. Administrative flexibility to respond to evolving legal developments is
the ultimate benchmark. Not every principle essential to the effective
administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the
mold of a general rule. Some principles must await development,
while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforseeable situations: "'In performing its important functions in these respects,
therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by
general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action
to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.' "117
The pertinent Supreme Court decisions strike a balance between
abstract preference for administrative rulemaking and the necessity of
insuring agency flexibility. The balance preponderates in favor of the
latter. 1 8 Although the Court has never fully explicated these tensions, the real debate is not merely a choice between the greater administrative flexibility of adjudication and the greater procedural
fairness of the rulemaking process. The ultimate choice is between
lesser and greater political responsiveness on the part of the NLRB:
[T]o analyze the question of NLRB rulemaking solely in terms of procedural
fairness is to disregard the critical issue of the NLRB's relationship to Con113. Id. at 294.

114. Id.
115. Id. at 295.
116. Chesrow, supra note 24, at 577 ("The Supreme Court's decision [in Bell] indicates
that it will sanction judicially enforced compulsory rulemaking only when an
agency has abused its discretion in proceeding by adjudication.")
117. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974) (quoting SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
118. In answering the Court's last decision on the adjudication and rulemaking controversy regarding NLRB law and policy-making, one commentator concluded:
'The Supreme Court placed equal or greater weight on the agency's interest in
preserving the flexibility of the administrative process, which includes the power
to act quasi-judicially as well as quasi-legislatively in making policy." Chesrow,
supra note 24, at 576.
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gress and the federal judiciary. ... [Flor Congress to require NLRB rulemaking solely on the basis of procedural considerations would be to use the wrong
analytical framework to resolve a far more complex dilemma.' 1 9

With the dominance of the Chenery-Bell line of cases, the Court
has endorsed the agency's greater political dynamism effected via the
NLRB's traditional adjudication. The Board's adjudicative, proactive
use of evolving political factors, endorsed by the Court, is better suited
to development and effectuation of national labor policy than is
rulemaking. 2 0 The Board must periodically change labor policy. This
is an inherent part of the Board's mandate from Congress, given the
statutory scheme of the NLRA.121 To direct the Board to stop making
policy would be to "command the impossible."2 2 Indeed, "if the
Board members attempted to comply, the almost certain result would
be a lower and less satisfactory level of labor law in action."=
Endorsement of Board policy-making is certainly not tantamount
to approving sweeping, unprincipled delegation of core congressional
responsibilities to an administrative agency. 124 Rather, it is a realistic
appreciation of, at the very least, the necessity of the Board clarifying
and elucidating the Delphic semantics of the original statutory language.' 2 5 The artful language of the statute requires Board interpretation, and the process of interpretation necessarily involves
lawmaking by the Board.126 As one commentator has remarked:
"[T]he Board cannot 'administer the law as written and as intended by
Congress.' In many of the most critical areas neither the words nor
the intent are clear. The Board must spell out whole bodies of law
119. Note NLRB Rulemaking,supra note 24, at 1001.
120. Id. at 984. In several important labor cases within the first decade of the NLRA,
the Court repeatedly referred to the Board's ability to make labor policy See
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 425 (1947); NLRB v. E. C.
Atkins & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 414-15 (1947); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 793, 803 (1945).
121. Peck, A Critiqueof the NLRB, supra note 24, at 257.
122. Id. See also Summers, supra note 24, at 96:
It is evident that the Board cannot "administer the statute as written and
as intended by Congress." The words of the statute and the intent of
Congress provide some limitations and guides, but there still remains a
substantial area of discretion within which the Board must make choices
between competing values and policies. Denying the existence of this
power does not avoid its exercise, but only obstructs any useful inquiry
into the appropriate standards and procedures for the exercise of that
power.
See generally Winter, supra note 53.
123. Peck, A Critique of the NLRB, supra note 24, at 257.
124. For the author's work advocating revitalization of a refined nondelegation doctrins, see Gregory, The CongressionalResponse to NLRB v. Bildisco and The Constitutional Subtleties of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 U. DEoiTR
L. REv.
(1985).
125. Peck, A Critiqueof the NLRB, supra note 24, at 259.
126. Bernstein, supra note 20, at 574.
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from meager terms or no terms at all."127 Whether it utilizes
rulemaking or adjudication, the Board makes policy choices: "The
Board, in exercising its functions of interpreting and elaborating the
skeletal words of the statute, is compelled to mould and develop a
body of law. It cannot act as a mechanical brain, but must choose between competing considerations."' 128
Slavish, myopic devotion to the ultimately illusory and frustrating
task of attempting solely to ferret out the intent of Congress from the
original language and legislative history of the NLRA evades the purpose of responsible legislative delegation to the administrative agency:
The statutory words alone are all too often inadequate if not misleading
guides, for many have a boundless vagueness, others have an irascible ambiguity, and still others are vulnerable to a destructive literalness. Precision is not
always gained by searching for the will-o-wisp of congressional intent, for
often little light is to be found in the cloudy recesses of the legislative mind.
One of the pressing reasons for delegating power to administrative agencies is
that legislators do not know or cannot agree on the precise results they
seek. 1 29

The NLRB's political choices are at the heart of its function as the
agency charged with administration of the NLRA, itself an amalgamation of congressional policy preferences. As Professor Summers
maintained:
The board, in deciding cases arising under the statute, must exercise the
power of choice. The choice is between alternatives which represent not only
conflicting interests of the immediate parties but also conflicting views as to
labor policy. The new members may make the same choices as the old members, or they may make different choices and order changes, but willy-nilly
they must choose. The Board could not, if it would, escape its functions of
policy-making. 1 3 0 .

However, this certainly is not to endorse purely personal preferences. Board members must constantly guard against this danger and
make general majoritarian political preferences, consistent with the
Act, the basis for NLRB policy. 131 As one observer cautioned:
It is natural and proper that with the change in political climate, there should
be changes in the rules and decisions of the Board. However, the Board
should keep within the broad limits of the basic statutory purposes, and
127. Summers, supra note 24, at 95 (quoting Farmer, The NLRB: Its Pas Presentand
Future,23 TNN. L. REV. 112, 112 (1954)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 101.
130. Id. at 98. See also Feldesman, May The LaborBoard Make Policy?, 52 GEo. L.J.
527, 539 (1964) ("There can be no doubt of the Board's authority to make policy in
the exercise of the diverse discretion Congress conferred upon it to carry out its
mission to effectuate the purpose of the act.").
131. See, ag., Summers, supra note 24, at 101: 'The danger of administrative legislation lies not in the open flaunting of statutory language. It lies rather in the
failure to adhere to the underlying purposes of the statute. Through lack of
either insight or self-restraint, the members of the agency may unconsciously
substitute their personal judgment of values for those premised by the statute."
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should neither repudiate the policy choices made by the statute nor defeat its
132
principal objectives.

The Board's elucidating interpretation of the Act ineluctably implicates policy and politics in the same construct: "Since the NLRB will
have to make and reassess policy judgments in the area it regulates, a
political coloration will inevitably be cast upon the Board's activities." 33 The Board's political responsiveness and flexibility in evolving policy determinations through adjudication operate as federal
safety valves on labor law tensions: "A politically responsive NLRB
allows national labor policy to be modified without requiring public
dissatisfaction to reach the high level necessary for legislative reform."13 4 For all of these reasons, continued NLRB adjudication,
rather than rulemaking, must remain the preferred policy and lawmaking instrument. Centralization of labor law jurisprudence can
never be realized by calcification of policy through the cumbersome
baggage of rulemaking. Adjudication is the better internal device for
labor law coherence. The political tensions that result can be best harmonized by a federal labor court of appeals, rather than by struggling
in frustration on the slippery slope of rulemaking.
III.

RE-EXAMINING PROPOSALS FOR THE CREATION OF A
FEDERAL LABOR COURT OF APPEALS

A.

An Overview

The essential problem that afflicted prior proposals for a federal
labor court is that they would have accomplished too much, rather
than not do enough, to reform labor law adminsitration.13 5 Rather
than present another idealistic comprehensive reform plan doomed to
132. Id. at 107.
133. Peck, A Critique of the NLRB, supra note 24, at 259. Cf. Foegen, What's Right is
Right - Labor Board Should Not Be Political,13 LAB. L.J. 1060 (1962).
134. Note, NLRB Rulemaking, supra note 24, at 1000.
135. However, Professor Morris, architect of the most comprehensive reform plans,
maintains that other proposals failed because they were not sufficiently holistic:
It is sufficient simply to note a fundamental deficiency common to all of
them: each proposal repeats the errors of the blind men describing the
elephant and fails to treat the interrelated subjects of labor law as a
whole. Many of the proposals would probably provide some limited improvements over the present situation ....
None would get at the root
of the overall problem.
Morris, The Case For UnitaryEnforcement of FederalLabor Law ConcerningA
Specialized Article III Court and the Reorganizationof ExistingAgencies, 26 Sw.
L.J. 471, 496-97 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Morris, UiitaryEnforcement]. See
also Morris, The National Labor Relations Board Its Future, 26 LAB. L.J. 334
(1975) ("A unitary system of enforcement which would interrelate ... identify
and vitiate the various laws which regulate employee relations, would be the
proper course for labor reform generally.") [hereinafter cited as Morris, The
NLRB: Its Future].
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frustration, this Article maintains that "less may be better." The primary benefit of the federal labor court of appeals would be stabilization and centralization of labor law administration, while preserving
the political dynamism of the NLRB.
Splits of authority among the various circuit courts of appeals on
the same issues will be eliminated. Appeals taken from NLRB decisions will gradually and steadily abate, and NLRA-based case law will
achieve equilibrium. Certiorari petitions with the Supreme Court on
NLRA matters will be virtually eliminated. All of these positive developments will occur without depriving the NLRB of its necessary
political flexibility. Since the NLRB will not be directly altered by
this proposal, Board adjudication will continue, and the process of
staggered Board appointments by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate will remain intact. The NLRB will continue to
be able to reflect political majoritarian labor philosophy in its decision-making.
A quarter century ago, a former chair of the NLRB predicted that
some variation of a labor court was inevitable. 136 During the Nixon
administration, a number of proposals were offered. It is certainly
time to re-examine the merits of a proposed federal labor court of appeals that is politically capable of implementation. Unlike many prior
reforms, this new proposal for a federal labor court of appeals would
not supplant the NLRB. It would have no direct bearing on present
NLRB adjudicatory practice. The NLRB would sacrifice none of its
jurisdiction to this court, nor would any function performed by NLRB
personnel, such as the Office of the General Counsel and the Administrative Law Judges, be transferred to this court.
Well aware of the aphorism that "the more things change, the
more they stay the same," this Article is certainly not advocating
change for change's sake. There is nothing to be gained, and much to
be risked, in reform exercises that would only needlessly "churn" the
law.
There are several advantages to this present and more modest, but
core, proposal for a federal labor court of appeals. Most immediately,
the court would partially defuse some of the particularly strident current criticisms of the Board. The Board, while still appropriately politically responsive to popular sentiments, would be more conscious of
labor doctrine stabilized by the single appellate court. The Board
would more carefully consider possible reversals of its own prior cases.
Poorly reasoned NLRB reversals would not be sanctioned by the
court. Thus, spasmodic and fitful reversals by the Board of its own
136. See Farmer, Problems of OrganizationandAdminsitrationof the NationalLabor
Relations Board, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 353, 356 (1960) ("[T]he ultimate transfer
of the Board's judicial functions to a labor court or even to the existing federal
district courts may now be reasonably predicted.").

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:75

prior decisions would be minimized in frequency and severity. The
NLRB could still overrule its own prior decisions, but only after careful thought. More stability would be built into labor law. The law
would evolve, rather than mutate. Sheer political expediency by the
Board would be effectively checked. While implementation of a federal labor court of appeals poses its own constitutional and political
difficulties, they can be effectively met. One federal labor court of
appeals reviewing all appeals of NLRB decisions would substantially
ease the concerns of critics who see the Board as a legally unaccountable political aberration.
There are considerable advantages to both alleviating current criticisms of Board politics and yet insuring that the Board continues to
function without internal structural or jurisdictional changes. The
federal labor court of appeals would positively harmonize these tensions. At the expense of sacrificing the dubious advantages of contrasting views of various circuits, labor law appellate expertise would
be coordinated in one federal labor court of appeals. 3 7 The twelve
federal appellate courts have only occasionally manifested NLRA expertise, and then to markedly varying degrees. This historic lack of
coordinated labor law sophistication accounts for the frequent conflicts among various circuits on NLRA issues. These conflicts would
now be eliminated.
B.

The Constitutional Dimension to the Judicial Appointment Process

If carefully structured, implementation of a federal labor court of
appeals should not pose any constitutional problems. There are two
primary avenues by which the labor court could be constitutionally
designed. As federal judges, they would be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. If appointed to a term of
137. Bartosic, supra note 16, at 668:
A specialized Labor Court would develop into an expert judicial body
rendering more enlightened and prompt decisions than courts of appeals.
Establishing one appellate forum would also eliminate what many consider to be undignified forum shopping and unseemly races to the courthouse. In addition, it would eliminate conflicting appellate decisions,
which create uncertainty and cause delay by requiring Supreme Court
resolution.
However, others see any labor court as a wholly utopian demand for homogeneity
in a heterogeneous labor and political envornment. More broadly, the labor court
proposals have been viewed as part of an unrealistic Hamiltonian political agenda
to return inordinate power to the federal government. See, e.g., Samoff, What
Lies Ahead for The NLRB?, supra note 24, at 413, 417:
A labor court seems like an ideal solution. It appears so logical and symmetrical. Now we have multiple layers of intermediate bodies before
reaching a circuit court. A single labor court would concentrate power in
one place. This is just not compatible with the American pattern of separate pathways and tribunals.... The American soil is unreceptive to
concentrating so much power in one court.
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years, the court would constitutionally operate as an Article I court.138
If the judges were appointed with life tenure, it would be an Article
III court.

3 9

Legitimate arguments can be made for either type of

court and the contour of the judges' tenure. Doctrinal stability and
the prestige consonant with the office of a federal court of appeals
judge favors the life tenure of an Article III court. As a former chair
of the NLRB summarized, life tenure for the judges of the labor court
"would eliminate any temptation for a member to color his decisions
in the latter part of a fairly short term of office with an eye to courting
reappointment by the administration in power or to future employment by labor or management or by law firms representing one or the
other." 40 The countervailing consideration for a term of years is
maintenance of doctrinal stability while avoiding the negative of intellectual rigidity on the part of individual judges.'41 However, federal
courts with judges lacking life tenure are more subject to attack as
unconstitutional.142 One must also not confuse the call for a labor
138. Article I courts are legislative courts, not judicial courts. Article I judges have
terms for years, not life tenure. See U.S. CoNsT. art 1, § 8, cl. 9: 'The Congress
shall have power. . . to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."
139. Id. at art. III, § 1, which states in part: 'The judicial power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."
140. Miller, The NLRB - Pas4 Present and Future,43 N.Y.B.J. 86, 90 (1971).
141. Dean Bartosic, a prominent proponent of a federal labor court, opposes life tenure for the judges: "MIhe national labor policy should by an evolutionary process
be responsive to political, economic and social changes. Replacing the Board with
lifetime judges would minimize change at the risk of stagnation." Bartosic, supra
note 16, at 660.
142. A term of years for the judges of the federal labor court of appeals would not pose
insurmountable constitutional difficulties. Such a problem did occur regarding
the bankruptcy courts. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-09 (1978), violated Article HI. The Constitution requires the judicial power of the United States to be vested in Article HI judges. Bankruptcy
courts presumed to exercise federal powers, but did not employe Article HI life
tenure judges. The Supreme Court summarized:
Art. I bars Congress from establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to those arising under the bankruptcy
laws. The establishment of such courts does not fall within any of the
historically recognized situations in which the general principle of independent adjudication commanded by Article HI does not apply.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982).
This Supreme Court decision in 1982 sparked a constitutional crisis that
threatened to terminate the bankruptcy courts. Resolution was finally effected
over two years later, via the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353,98 Stat 333 (to be codified at various places in 11 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C.). For discussion of the constitutional difficulties afflicting the
bankruptcy courts, from the Supreme Court decision to beyond the remedial legislation, as seen through the labor prism, see Gregory, Legal Developments Since
NLRB v. Bildisco: PartialResolution of ProblemsRegardingLabor ContractRejection In Bankruptcy, 62 U. DENVER L. REV. 615 (1985); Gregory, supra note 124;
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court with an inappropriate analogy to the Article I Tax Court, for
example. The Constitution expressly refers to the power of Congress
to "lay and collect" taxes. There is, however, no express constitutional reference to labor relations matters, with the exception of the
arguable, indirect Article I, section 10 reference to freedom of contract. This is yet another reason militating in favor of an Article III
structure for the proposed federal labor court of appeals.
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated a preference for Article III to serve as the constitutional structure for lower federal
courts, 14 3 and an Article III labor court is a primary component of the

reform plans of the principal architect. 144 There is certainly no question that Congress may create courts with limited jurisdiction pursuant to Article III. An Article III federal labor court of appeals would
be the better alternative to avoid the constitutional difficulties invited
by Article I.
C. Difficulties with an Alternative Non-Appellate Labor Court
Prior reforms have called for a federal labor court that would operate as a trial court, 14 5 or otherwise transfer present Board functions to
Gregory, Labor ContractRejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court'sAttack
on Labor In NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C.L. REV. 539 (1984).
143. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathan Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the
Court held the bankruptcy courts unconstitutional because they were Article I,
dependent legislative courts presuming to exercise Article III powers concerning
the bankruptcy laws. See supra note 142. See also Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 519
(1966) (the Court held that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was an
Article III court); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
144. Morris, ProceduralReform in Labor Law - a PreliminaryPaper,35 J. AIR L. &
COMM. 537, 560-62 (1969).
145. This was the essence of the plan advanced by Republican Senator Robert Griffin
of Michigan, who was the co-sponsor of the Landrum-Griffin Amendments of
1959, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. See S. 103, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The Griffin proposal would have seated a 15 judge federal
labor court with exclusive jurisdiction over NLRA complaint and representation
cases. The judges would serve 20 year terms upon presidential appointment. The
administrative law judges would be replaced by ninety commissioners to conduct
unfair labor practice hearings. The commissioners would be subject to removal
by the labor court. The general counsel of the Board would be replaced by an
analogous administrator to prosecute cases. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would apply to all proceedings.
Professor Morris also advanced a comprehensive proposal for a specialized
federal court with sweeping jurisdiction over the Railway Labor Act (RLA), the
NLRA, and 29 U.S.C. §§ 301 to 303 (1982), suits for breaches of labor contract and
damages suits for illegal union secondary boycotts. See generally Morris, supra
note 144; Morris, Unitary Enforcement, supra note 35, at 504. There are some
advantages to a labor court with powers of a federal district court; summary judgments and injunctive relief would expedite the legal process. This would be more
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the federal district courts. 146 In addition, allied proposals apart from
labor court schemes would modify the internal processes of the
47
Board.1
If all of the trial functions of the administrative law judges of the
NLRB were transferred to the federal district courts, it could send
approximately 50,000 additional cases into the federal trial courts each
year.148 Each federal district court judge could see more than ninety
additional cases on the docket. While this would not collapse the federal district courts, 149 it would surely constitute a heavy new burden

146.

147.

148.

149.

efficacious than the NLRB's inability to enforce its orders. However, the plan
would eventually supplant the NLRB.
For other proposals for a trial-level labor court equivalent to the federal district courts, see Powell & Goerlich, An Invitation To Improve A Government
Service, 25 AD. L. REv. 49,56-60 (1973); Schutkin, One Nation Indivisible - A Plea
for a United States Court of Labor Relations, 20 LAB. L.J. 94 (1969). Seligson,
supra note 11, at 108, states: '"TheBoard has fulfilled its initial function. Its abolition and replacement by a technically competent bureaucracy of trial examiners
to handle day-to-day relations between labor and management might be another
aid in the continuing development of better labor-management relations."
This was the heart of the proposal by Republication Senator John Tower of
Texas. Unfair labor practice jurisdiction would have been transferred form the
NLRB to federal district courts. See, e.g., S. 1384, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S.
3671, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). These two bills introduced by Senator Tower
were virtually identical. See also DistrictCourt JurisdictionOver UnfairLabor
PracticeCases: Hearingson S.3671 Before the Subcomm. on Separationof Power
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Lyne The National Labor Relations BoardAnd Suggested Alternatives, 22 LAB. L.J. 408, 418
(1971); Miller, AdministrativeProsecutionBut Decisions by the Court - A Way
Out Of The ProceduralMorass of U. S. Labor Law?, 12 GONZ. L. REv. 19, 28
(1976).
For criticism of earlier proposals to transfer NLRB functions to federal district courts, see Miller, supra note 140, at 91.
H. R. 7152, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Congressperson Thompson's bill would
have retained the NLRB, with certiorari discretion over Administrative Law
Judge decisions and self enforcing NLRB orders. Several academic and legislative proposals would repeal the Railway Labor Act and incorporate railroads and
airlines under the auspices of the NLRA. See, e.g., S. 560, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971). This was the legislation proposed by Republican Senators Robert Dole
and Robert Griffin.
In fiscal year 1984, 43,426 cases were filed, the lowest total since 1974. Of those,
34,855 of the cases were unfair practices, a decrease of 12.9 percent from 1983.
NLRB General Counsel's Summary of Operations For FY 1984, 118 LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 121, 122 (Feb. 18,1985) [hereinafter cited as OperationsForFY1984].
In fiscal year 1983, 48,840 cases were filed; 46,665 cases were filed in 1982; and
58,897 were filed in 1981. NLRB General Counsel's Summary of OperationsFor
Fiscal1983, 114 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 301, 302 (Dec. 19, 1983) [hereinafter cited
as OperationsFor Fiscal 1983].
Lyne, supra note 146, at 419 (estimating that each federal district judge would
hear an additional two or three cases each year). But cf. Bartosic, supra note 16,
at 656 ("Thus, some 30,000 labor cases a year could potentially flood the district
coruts. The resultant delay would not only dilute the effectiveness of the nation's
labor laws but also would tax the country's court system beyond tolerable limits
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and cause attendant delay in deciding the non-NLRA federal cases. Of
course, the majority of unfair labor practice charges under the Act do
not result in issuance of a complaint by the Board. Ultimately, only
about 10 percent of the initial charges ever proceed to decision by the
NLRB.150 While each federal judge would therefore see less than ten
cases added to the docket, the most negative ramification of transferring Board functions to the federal district courts would be the demolition of an expert bureaucracy with a half century of NLRA
expertise, relegating these often complex cases to already beleagured
and often less than labor-expert federal district judges.1S1 As one
commentator has pointed out, "to abolish the Board because of its imperfections would be like abolishing the railroads because they are doing an unsatisfactory job of carrying passengers."1 52 Under the
present proposal, the Board's functions would not be directly altered.
A single labor court of appeals would centralize all appeals from
Board decisions, and gradually stablize labor law jurisprudence under
the NLRA.
and produce delay in non-labor cases."). See also Foeller, Comments on Recent
Proposalsfor Improving the Administrative Proceduresfor the NLRB, 24 LAB.
L.J. 81, 87 (1983); Leedom, Judicializingthe AdministrativeProcess: Can Labels
Change Facts?, 3 S.D.L. REv. 1, 3-6 (1958).
150. Lyne, supra note 146, at 419. In fiscal year 1983, a record 11,535 settlements were
obtained. Only 4,544 complaints were issued from an original intake of 48,740
cases filed. Operationsfor Fiscal 1983, supra note 148, at 302-03. In fiscal year
1984, 10,731 settlements occurred, and only 3,610 unfair labor practices complaints
were issued from an intake of 34,855 cases. Operationsfor FY 1984, supra note
148, at 122.
151. Bartosic, supra note 16, at 661 ("[D]istrict court judges now have relatively little
contact with Taft-Hartley and are ill-trained to administer it."). But c. Lyne,
supra note 146, at 419:
Some commentators argue that only a special court or administrative
body with the expertise of the present Board could handle the complications of present day labor law. This argument overlooks the fact that our
present federal district courts have successfully managed to acquire the
expertise necessary to decide the controversies arising under our complicated law dealing with taxation, patents, anti-trust, utilities, transportation, broadcasting, admiralty, natural resources, etc. For the labor law
practitioner to assert that the field of his endeavor stands uniquely alone
among federal jurisprudence as the one field too complicated for comprehension by the ordinary federal district judge sounds both pompous
and unreal.
Petro, supra note 12, at 1127, argues that: "The federal courts ... lack
neither experience nor "knowhow" in labor cases.... [Oin the whole the federal judiciary does a first-rate job." See also Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of
LaborBoard Expertise, 39 U. CHi. L. REv. 681 (1972). Cf. Feldesman, supra note
130, at 536 ("However strongly one may wish to question the Board's 'expertise,'
one cannot deny that it acquires considerable specialized knowledge no one else
can obtain because it concentrates exclusively and continuously on the very numerous matters arising under the act.").
152. Wilson, Labor Law Reform - Needed Now, 56 A.B.A. J. 248 (1970).
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The Structure of the Proposed Federal Labor Court of Appeals

The proposed federal labor court of appeals would hear all appeals
of the NLRB decisions. The twelve current federal courts of appeals
would no longer have jurisdiction over appeals from NLRB decisions. 1 53 For reasons of administrative efficiency and economy of resources, the labor court should be based in Washington, D.C. The
ultimate size of the court can be determined by the case load. This
should not be immediately ascertained, and can best be left for future
determination. 5 4
During recent years, the courts of appeals have been deciding approximately three hundred appeals from NLRB decisions annually.155
Earlier predictions of near-geometric increases in appeals have fortunately failed to materlize.156 Therefore, initial appointment of three
judges to the proposed labor court of appeals would be adequate. Because NLRA labor law issues would constitute the exclusive business
of the court, the case load would be manageable. As the labor appel153. Vesting jurisdiction of all appeals from NLRB unfair labor practice decisions in
one federal labor court of appeals would require amendment of § 10(f) of the Act,
which presently provides:
Any person aggrieved from a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such
order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the
unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or
wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ....
29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
154. "[A] careful study of the statistics concerning labor cases in the circuit courts of
appeal is necessary to determine the size of the court, areas and locations where it
should sit, and other such details of its composition and operation." Spann,
Foreward- A Labor Court of Appeals?, 4 GA. L. REV. 643, 645 (1970).
155. Note, NLRB Rulemaking,supra note 24, at 990.
156. In 1969, more than 50 percent of all NLRB decisions were taken to the federal
courts of appeals. In 1959, the appellate courts heard 83 cases; in 1969 they heard
363 cases on appeal from NLRB decisions. See Bartosic, supra note 16, at 654 n.56.
In 1978, the courts of appeals heard 333 appeals from NLRB decisions. 1978
NLRB ANN. REP. 43. More recently, 479 NLRB cases were decided by the courts
of appeals in 1981, 424 in 1982, 338 in 1983, and 259 in 1984.
In 1984, in addition to fewer appeals being taken, the NLRB had more substantive success before the circuits, winning in whole or in part in 81.1 percent of
the cases (81.6 percent in 1983, 79.7 percent in 1982 and 80.2 percent in 1981), and
losing entirely only 10.4 percent of the cases, which is the lowest level since 1976
(12.4 percent in 1983, 12.5 percent in 1982, and 13.8 percent in 1981). Operations
for Fy 1984, supra note 148, at 146.
Of course, one must bear in mind that these statistics can be manipulated.
One recent critic, former Board member Peter Walther, appointed by President
Ford in 1975 and highly displeased with the "pro-labor" orientation of the NLRB
during his Board tenure in the mid to late seventies, forwards substantially different conclusions. Based on his own survey of courts of appeals review of NLRB
decisions, Walther maintains the circuits reversed the NLRB in 53 percent of the
1979 cases and in 47 percent of the 1980 cases. Walther, supra note 9, at 217.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:75

late court's jurisprudence gradually assumed certain contours, the
case load would probably decrease.1 5 7 The NLRB and the private parties would be well aware of the labor court's philosophy, and would be
better able to assess the likelihood of success in individual cases. Forum shopping among the circuits would be eliminated. Weak cases
thoroughly inconsonant with the jurisprudence of the NLRB and the
labor court of appeals would rarely be pursued on appeal to the labor
court. As the case load decreased, the initial backlog would also dissipate. This would moot the need for appointment of additional judges.
More likely, as the case load decreased and the court's NLRA jurisprudence stabilized, thought could then be realistically given to expanding the court's appellate jurisdiction to non-NLRA labor and
employment law cases.
There is a more compelling immediate political reason for not determining the final number of judges from the outset. Implementation of a court permeated with politics would be difficult even under
ideal circumstances. One major advantage of the proposed court is
precisely to defuse, rather than to exacerbate, the political concerns of
the Board's current critics. The Reagan Board is broadly perceived by
many as a rigid anti-labor dogmatist. Even a Republican Senate would
be hard-pressed to expedite Republican presidential appointment of
rigidly ideological judges to the proposed federal labor court of appeals. Critics would see this as the intolerable coup de grace for the
NLRA and for labor. The organized labor lobby and Democratic senators would be certain to roadblock any scheme to canonize the perceived anti-labor ideology of the Reagan Board in a court of appeals.
The proposal for the court would be utterly futile if these legitimate
labor concerns could not be effectively addressed. The solution lies in
the ability to engineer a political deal prior to, and as an unstated tacitly understood part of, the presidential appointment process. Very
recent legislative history has demonstrated the considerable political
ability of the organized labor lobby and Democratic representatives to
effect compromise with Republican senators regarding the presidential appointment of new judges to a revamped Bankruptcy Court.
Rather than provide for appointment of all judges by one President,
the appointment process should be spread over more than one term
andor more than one administration.158
Initially, therefore, there would be prior consultation by the appointing President with leaders of the opposition party. Politically, de
157. Morris, Unitary Enforcement,supra note 135, at 506 ("It is hoped that in the long
run the judicial stature of the United States Labor Court will be deemed so substantial that under the unitary system there would be fewer reversals on appeal
than under the present system, so that ultimately the number of appeals would
also be reduced.").
158. Id. at 500.
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facto guarantees would have to be made by the President to key opposition senators. In order to transform this proposed federal labor
court of appeals into political reality, the President would have to insure the prior approval of opposition senators to the acceptable prospective nominees to the court. Greater Senate participation in
Presidential appointments, via strengthened roles of advice and consent, is fully consonant with the Senate's express constitutional
responsibiity. 159
For example, if the court were to be implemented initially with
three members, one of the initial judges would not be a member of the
appointing President's political party. In addition, although not part
of the necessary enabling legislation, if the case load eventually warranted additional appointments, the balance could be preserved by
providing for no further appointments until the next presidential
term. Then, for example, contingent provisions for three additional
judges again would insure that at least one of the three judges would
not be a member of the then appointing President's political party.
Although this would not fully placate the wary political opposition
at the outset, a structured, sequential appointment process would provide for a coordinated and politically balanced initial implementation
of the court. 160 Current and perhaps former members of the Board
would be removed from consideration. The most fertile ground would
be via volunteer transfers from present experienced circuit courts of
appeals judges, particularly those with labor law expertise. Federal
district judges and NLRB administrative law judges would also supplement the pool of prospective candidates for the initial three appointments. Thus, the pool of qualified candidates would be enriched
from the outset via present experienced judicial incumbents, in addition to the other usual sources in the active bar and in legal academia
for judicial appointments. Because of the political overlay in the appointment process, special care would have to be taken by the President and the Senate to appoint only the most qualified labor law
professionals available from the flexible middle of the political spectrum. Because of both political pragmatics and imperative intellectual
integrity, there would be no room for rigid ideologues on the court. Of
course, given the Reagan administration's record of appointing doctrinaire political conservatives, 161 necessary accomodations may not be
readily affected and the proposal could easily be doomed. Without
prior political guarantees of balanced, consensus appointments, the
legislation for the court would not be enacted. In part, therefore, this
159. Professor Tribe has advocated much closer Senate scrutiny of judicial appointees
of the President. See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COuRT (1985).
160. Morris, supra note 144, at 564-65.
161. Goldman, Reorganizing The Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JuDiCATURE 331 (1985).
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proposal is a challenge to the Reagan administration to effect the necessary political compromise in order to make a lasting positive contribution to labor law adminstration.
If appointment of a second group of three judges would be warranted by the caseload during the next presidential term, the six member court would then normally function in two panels. The three
member panels would resolve any divisions by mandatory en banc
hearings; discretionary en banc hearings on especially important cases
6
would further insure stable and coordinated development.1 2
Once this federal labor court of appeals reached its full membership of six judges over the course of two presidential terms, thought
could then be given to expanding the jurisdiction of the appellate
court to other labor law issues. 16 3 For example, perhaps all appeals
from federal district court decisions concerning the union duty of fair
representation could be handled by the court. This is certainly another labor law area where case law continues to proliferate; splits
among and even within the circuit courts of appeals abound.164 But,
until the labor court of appeals is at full strength and has demonstrated competence in deciding appeals from NLRB decisions, the
NLRA should be the sole initial source of the legal issues to be decided
by the court on appeal from NLRB decisions.165
162. Bartosic, supra note 16, at 668; Miller, supra note 140, at 91; Spann, supra note
154, at 645.
163. See infra note 164.
164. For discussion of the variety of DFR law decisions that continue to split the
courts of appeals, see Gregory, A Call For Supreme Court CZariftcation of the
Union Duty of FairRepresentation,29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 45 (1984). Other examples of possible labor and employment matters over which the federal labor court
would have future jurisdiction might include, in addition to DFR cases, wage and
hour matters under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and employment discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) to 2000e-17 (1982), Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S. C. §§ 621-34 (1982). See Morris, Unitary Enforcement, supra note 135; Morris, The NLRB: Its Future, supra note 135; Spann,
supra, note 154, at 645.
165. This is a point of major variance between the present proposal and the proposal
advocated by Dean Bartosic. He would vest §§ 301-03 trial jurisdiction immediately in a trial division of the federal labor court. See Bartosic, supra note 16, at
667. This is presuming "too much too soon," and partially compromises the pragmatism of his otherwise fine proposal. He later equivocates on when the court
would assume jurisdiction over §§ 301-03 cases. Id. at 671. Expanding the labor
court's jurisdiction to employment discrimination law, LMRDA matters, and
§§ 301-03 suits is a prospect for future assessment. This sweeping labor court jurisdiction, beyond NLRA issues, is also a hallmark of Professor Morris' proposal.
See Morris, supra note 144, at 563-66. Professor Morris saw this as a means of
alleviating the problem of overlapping court and agency jurisdiction over idential
labor law matters. Id. at 556-60. See also Zimmerman & Dunn, supra note 38, at 5
("The courts of appeals have limited geographic jurisdiction, while the Board
holds a nationwide charter Thus, the Board often refuses to acquiesce when one
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E. Advantages of the Proposal
The ultimate advantage from the single federal labor court of appeals would be greater coordination and stability of NLRA legal doctrine, 6 6 analogous to that effectuated in patent law via the federal
court of appeals or in tax law via the Tax Court. There would be no
interference with the labor law expertise of the Board. Rather than
have various circuits split on NLRA issues, appellate expertise would
be concentrated in the one federal appellate labor court, hearing all
appeals from NLRB decisions. Since there would no longer be conflicts among the circuits, one cause for labor law cases on the Supreme
Court's docket would be eliminated. The circuits would have more
time to devote to non-NLRA labor and to non-labor cases. Only labor
issues of fundamental importance would need to be resolved by the
Supreme Court. As the labor court of appeals' expertise increased, the
initial backlog of cases appealed from NLRB decisions would dissipate.
Reducing judicial and bureaucratic delays in labor law administration
has been a perennial and legitimate concern of all interested parties,
67
and could now be accomplished.1
The Board would continue to have primary responsibility for decision-making under the NLRA. However, with appellate decisions centered in one federal appellate court, the Board would be forced to
or more of the cricuit courts disagrees with its interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).").
166. Lyne, supranote 146, at 417. ("[Ihe goal of uniformity in labor law is more apt to
be obtained by the use of a single appellate tribunal.").
167. Professor Archibald Cox chaired a prominent panel that was most concerned
with reducing the inordinate delays that obstructed timely remedies in labor
cases. See Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law, Report to the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Organizationand Procedureof the
NationalLabor Relations Board, S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). See
also SUBCOMM. ON NLRB OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, REPORT,

87th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1961) ("[Tlhere is much needless delay inenforcement of
the Labor Board orders. . . the losing party 'delays, lingers, and waits' because
disobedience of a Labor Board order is not punishable until it is enforced by court
action.").
See also House Committee on Government Operations. Delay, Slowness in Decision-making,and the CaseBacklog at the NationalLabor Relations Board,H.R
Rep. No. U41, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984).
The J.P. Stevens Company has had the most notorious history of recalcitrance
and obstruction of the NLRB. The uniform contumacy of the company spanned
almost 20 years, from the early sixties until widespread settlements in a host of
related litigation in the early eighties. The initial point in the J. P. Stevens history is J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1965), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d
292 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
Prominent commentators have focused on the inordinate delays in the remedial process in labor law. Mechanisms to alleviate these delays are usually integral components of any structural reform proposal. See Bok, The Regulation of
Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 60-61 (1964).
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consider more carefully the appellate ramifications of any contem68
plated internal reversals by the Board of its own prior law.1
Except for those periods when the NLRB has operated with less
than the full complement of five members, as has been the situation
for most of the past two years, 1 69 most of the remedial delay has occurred in the courts of appeals and not at the NLRB.170 This is yet
another compelling reason for centralizing all appeals from NLRB decisions in a single federal labor court of appeals, rather than continue
the present dispersion among the circuits.
In 1982, Congress implemented the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, an Article III federal court of appeals with
exclusive jurisdiction of all patent case appeals from the federal district courts.171 This new federal court of appeals has functioned successfully, and has met with generally favorable scholarly
commentary.172 The proposed federal labor court of appeals is not to
be confused with the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, nor is it meant to suggest that each substantive body of law automatically merits its own federal court of appeals. In the present
situation, the complexity of NLRA law, the mercurial nature of
NLRB, frequent reversals of law and policy, and the dangerous
168. Spann, supra note 154, at 645.
169. A 1984 report adopted unanimously by the House Committee on Government Operations says: "[Tihe National Labor Relations Board is in a crisis. Delay in decision-making by the Board and a staggering case backlog have forced workers and
employers to wait years before cases are decided." Criticism,supra note 8, at 124.
170. See Bartosic, supra, note 16, at 654:
While the increased delay in enforcement proceedings must be viewed in
the context of the more than tripled volume of labor cases in the courts,
it is readily apparent that the major portion of delay exists at that level.
This is especially significnt in light of the Board's having reduced by almost one-third the time the median case is before the Board, despite
more than a doubling of contested unfair labor practice cases.
171. On Oct. 1, 1982, by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 171
(1982), a thirteenth Court of Appeals was created. It is formally called the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It is an intermediate appellate
court of restricted subject matter jurisdiction, formed by merging the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, two Article III courts formerly located in Washington D.C. The new federal court of appeals also has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from federal district courts of all patent cases. Its
jurisdiction is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982).
172. For thorough analysis of the new federal court of appeals and a compendium of
prior proposals regarding additional federal courts of appeals, see Adams, The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit More Than a NationalPatent Court,79
Mo. L. REV. 43 (1984).
See also Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982 - and Beyond, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 543 (1983); Posner, Will the Federal
Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?: An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the JudicalFunction,56 S. CAL. L. REv. 761 (1983); Note, An Appraisal of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,57 S. CAL. L. REv. 301 (1984).
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flashpoint political criticisms of Reagan Board ideology form a powerful synergy in favor of the proposed federal labor court of appeals.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Many of the articles advocating reforms of the NLRA and the
NLRB invited further discussion. This Article is an acceptance of
those invitations, and, in turn, constitutes an open invitation for continuing dialogue. Hopefully, this is also a positive refinement of those
prior reform plans. The objective is not utopia, but rather a realistic
plan that coordinates labor law and its administration in a coherent
federal network. The proposed federal labor court of appeals is an
integral part of this process. The positive improvements gained via
the proposed labor court of appeals would be substantial. Concomitantly, the properly political NLRB will retain necessary flexibility
via continued use of adjudication rather than rulemaking.
Maintaining the delicate balance between judicial doctrinal stability without rigidity, and NLRB political responsiveness without irresponsibility, is a difficult but indispensable task.173 Labor law is
inherently controversial. While present criticism of the Board is particularly heated, it is certainly not unprecedented. The Board and the
Act must remain intact and be strengthened rather than repealed. Legitimate criticisms have been made of seemingly unprincipled, cavain prior Board precedent.
lier, and precipitous spasms
Implementation of the proposed federal labor court of appeals is the
best means of responding to those criticisms while preserving the
Board and the Act and furthering the coordination of labor law
jurisprudence.

173. Maintaining the proper balance between stability and flexibility, while avoiding
the respective extremes of calcification and chaos, has always been a major jurisprudential concern. See T. O'HAGAN, THE END OF LAw? 4 (1984) ("An advanced legal system is complex and hierarchical. It embodies a system of rules
which is both rigid, guaranteeing reliability and predictability, and flexible, allowing for successful application to particular cases and for development according to meta-rules of change."). See also Feldesman, supra note 151, at 540-41:
Some flexibility is needed, moreover, to cope with a subject as highly
volatile as labor relations. There should be gaps in the statute. By parity
or reasoning Board policies ought not become so hardened that they cannot be modified to meet changing conditions. The whole desideratum is
the rule of reason and fairness in the light of express legislative policies.
Certainty, predictability and even symmetry in filling up the spaces are
only some, not all, of its parts.
There is constant movement in the world of industrial reality. Policies which have lost touch with that world can no longer be grounded in
reason, or in fairness, and should therefore be abandoned. Neither
should those which can be greatly improved remain unaltered. At all
times policies should fit the essential facts.

